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GEORGE NEBOLSINEt
EvER since the Supreme Court in the Bronson case 1 (1868) upheld
the validity of a contract calling for the payment of a sum of dollars
in gold coin, and gave judgment to the creditor in gold coin despite
the fact that gold was at a heavy premium over legal tender, the
gold clause 2 has been virtually a standard feature of long-term
private loans floated in the United States.3
Following the return of United States currency to the gold stand-
ard after the Civil War, and until the recent departure from that
standard, this clause remained a dormant feature of the contracts
containing it and aroused little interest among commentators. 4 Ob-
tMember of the New York Bar; former editor of the Yale Law Journal.
1. Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U. S. 229 (1868).
2. The usual form of gold clause embodied in domestic bond issues calls for
the payment of "One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) in gold coin of the United
States of America of or equal to the standard of weight and fineness existing
on" the date of the loan.' This must be distinguished from the gold coin clause
discussed in the Bronson case which merely specified blank dollars "in gold
coin." See The Effect of Revalorization of the Gold Dollar aad the "weight
and fineness" Clause, infra p. 1075.
3. The "gold coin" clause is primarily an American development. The
English practice prior to the War was to float foreign as well as domestic
issues almost exclusively in Pounds Sterling, with no express reference to gold
coin in the agreement. On the Continent, however, "gold" loans were fairly
common, but these again did not usually specify gold coin of a standard of
-weight and fineness, but merely so many "francs or." This may be translated
into American terms as so many gold dollars. In the United States, the pre-
ponderance of corporate mortgages are, however, payable in gold coin of a
named standard of weight and fineness, and most Federal and municipal bonds
contain a similar provision. It may be roughly estimated that about 95c,% of
all publicly offered securities in the United States, totalling upward of fift,
billions of dollars in face value, contain the gold clause or some modification
thereof.
4. Few studies have appeared treating the legal phases of this subject.
The leading publications in English on this question are: HUNT, LAW o TEN
(1903) ; BRECKENRiDGE, LEGAL TENDER (1903), a historical study of the legal
tender concept; Madden and Nadler, Gold Clause (1929) INsTrruTE oF IN-
TER-zATIONAL FiNANCE, Bulletin No. 27 (Special Bulletin No. 4), a useful study
of various types of clauses in international loans; Garis, The Gold Clause
(1933) 165 ANN. Aiu. ACAD. 219, a very suggestive article laying special em-
phasis on state jurisdiction in the gold clause matter. Madden and Nadler, The
Gold Clause (1932) 12 BARRoN's No. 23, p. 10 (June 6, 1932); and Adams,
The Gold Clause (1932) 12 BARRON's No. 34, p. 11 (Aug. 22, 1932), are briefer
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viously, so long as the currency in which the loan is contracted
remained on a gold basis, that is, readily convertible into gold coin
at par, and there existed no immediate fear of suspension of con-
vertibility, holders of gold coin obligations have been willing to
accept any form of currency at par in discharge of the obligation,
and a creditor's invocation of the debtor's assumed duty to pay in
gold coin would have constituted a mere formality. Consequently,
until recently, the almost universal practice of debtors on obligations
containing the gold clause has been to disregard the gold coin fea-
ture and to make the payments of interest and principal by setting
up appropriate bank credits with their fiscal agents or making
payment by check or in currency. In practical effect, a gold clause
added nothing to the burden of the debtor.
However, the recent suspension of convertibility of currency notes
and the imposition of a gold embargo,5 by threatening to create a
disparity between the value of the paper dollar and its statutory
gold content, together with the power which may become vested in
the President to reduce the gold content of the dollar, O have now
rendered extremely significant the gold clause provisions of private
contracts. The problem of construing these provisions which now
faces the large number of debtors and creditors immediately con-
cerned with the performance of such contracts, warrants a detailed
consideration of the legal effect of the gold clause. Such a discus-
sion cannot be undertaken, however, without a prefatory reference
to the rights of parties under debt contracts carrying ordinary
currency clauses; nor would it be complete without some indication
of the possible alternative measures of debt obligations, such as
bullion or commodity clauses, available to future contracting parties.
I
Currency Clauses
Where an obligation merely specifies a certain number of "United
States Dollars" or employs the symbol "$", and repayment is to be
made in the United States, there is no doubt that the creditor, suing
in the country of payment, can obtain a judgment only for the sum
stipulated in the contract, in legal tender. The medium of repay-
ment of debts contracted in terms of currency is thus whatever the
discussions. Mention must also be made of the most comprehensive work on
the subject in any language. NussBAuM, A., DAS GELD IN THEORIB UND PRAXIS
DES DEUTSCHEN UND AUSLANDISCHEN RECHTS (1925).
5. The regulations which in effect put the United States off tho gold
standard are analysed below. See note 84, infra.
6. See note 64, infra.
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law has impressed with the character of legal tender. Legal tender
may be defined as money which cannot lawfully be refused by a
creditor.7 In the United States the situation is somewhat compli-
cated by the fact that there are a number of forms of money, having
wide circulation, the legal tender qualities of which are doubtful.8
7. 1 BL. Co:i m. *276; HUNT, op. sit. supra note 4, at 61, § 68.
8. Under the Thomas Amendment to the Farm Relief Bill, Part VI, Sec.
34 (b) 1, it is provided: "Such notes and all other coins and currencies hereto-
fore issued by or under the authority of the United States shall be legal tender
for all debts public and private." This is a drastic extension of the Legal
Tender Acts and is bound to raise constitutional questions in view of its
uncertain legality. A brief summary of the tender characteristics of currency
in circulation in the United States prior to the Farm Relief Bill is given
below:
1. Gold coins-Legal tender in all payments at their nominal value. R. S.
§ 3585 (1878), 31 U. S. C. § 457 (1926).
2. Gold certificates-Legal tender in payment of all debts and dues,
public and private. 41 STAT. 370 (1919), 31 U. S. C. § 451 (1926).
3. Silver dollars-Legal tender at nominal value, for all debts and dues,
public and private, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the
contract. 20 STAT. 25 (1878), 31 U. S. C. § 458 (1926).
4. Subsidiary silver coins-Legal tender for sums not exceeding $10 in
full payment of all dues, public and private. 21 STAT. 8 (1879), 31 U. S. C.
§ 459 (1926).
5. Minor coins-Legal tender, at their nominal value, for any amount not
exceeding 25 cents in any one payment. R. S. § 3587 (1878), 31 U. S. C.
§ 460 (1926). It is lawful for the Treasurer to redeem in "lawful money"
under such rules as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury
all copper, bronze, and copper-metal coins presented in sums of not less
than $20. 34 STAT. 132 (1906), 31 U. S. C. § 341 (1926).
6. United States notes--lawfu money and a legal tender in payment of
all debts, public and private, within the United States, except for duties
on imports and interest on the public debt." R. S. § 3588 (1878), 31
U. S. C. § 452 (1926).
7. Silver certificates-Receivable for customs, taxes and all public dues.
24 STAT. 515(1887), 31 U. S. C. § 405 (1926).
8. Treasury notes-Legal tender in payment of all debts, public and
private, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract, and
receivable for customs, taxes, and all public dues. 31 STAT. 47 (1900), 31
U. S. C. § 410 (1926). Demand Treasury notes authorized by the Act of
July 17, 1861, c. 5, and the Act of February 12, 1862, c. 20, are 'lawful
money" and are legal tender in like manner as United States notes. Treasury
notes issued under the Act of July 14, 1890, c. 708, are legal tender in
payment of all debts, public and private, except where otherwise expressly
stipulated in the contract. 26 STAT. 289 (1890), 31 U. S. C. § 453 (1926).
Interest-bearing notes issued under Act of March 3, 1863, c. 73, and June
30, 1864, c. 172, are legal tender to the same extent as United States notes
for their face value, excluding interest, but not in payment or redemption
of any notes issued by any bank, banking association, or banker, calculated
and intended to circulate as money. R. S. § 3590 (1878), 31 U. S. C. §
454 (1926).
An examination of the statutes defining Federal Reserve Notes,
National Bank Notes and Silver Certificates fails to reveal any
provision that would make such notes legal tender for private debts.
Such currency, if it is not legal tender, may be rejected by a private
creditor of a "dollar" obligation. But the fact that the money which
is tendered on the due date of an obligation stipulating payment
simply in dollars, was made legal tender after the contract was
entered into, and is of a different character, and is less valuable in
terms of goods or gold than the legal tender in existence when the
debt was contracted, is not a valid ground for a creditor's refusing
it or for demanding a premium in excess of the stipulated amount
of the debt.9 This was indubitably established, so far as American
9. Federal Reserve notes-Are obligations of the United States and shall
be receivable by all national and member banks and Federal Reserve banks
and for all taxes, customs, and other public dues. They shall be redeemed
in gold on demand at the Treasury Department of the United States, in
the City of Washington, District of Columbia, or in gold or lawful money
at any Federal Reserve bank. 38 STAT. 265 (1913), 12 U. S. C. § 411 (1926).
In MacLeod v. Hoover, 159 La. 244, 105 So. 305 (1925), the Louisiana court
indicated that Federal Reserve notes are good legal tender unless objected
to by the recipient. But see under National Bank notes, infra.
10. National bank notes-The provisions governing the issue of these
notes are contained in 12 U. S. C. § 101 (1926) et seq. No mention is hero
made of legal tender quality. Section 109 (41 STAT. 387 (1920)) declares
that "Any association receiving circulating notes under this chapter may
. . . issue, and circulate the same as money. . . . And such notes shall
be received at par in all parts of the United States in payment of taxes,
excises, public lands and all other dues to the United States except duties
on imports; and also for all salaries and other debts and demands owing by
the United States to individuals, corporations, and associations within the
United States, except interest on the public debt, and in redemption of the
national currency." 31 STAT. 46 (1900), 31 U. S. C. § 455 (1926) provides:
"Legal-tender quality of money not affected by certain sections. Nothing
contained in sections 146, 313, 314, 320, 406, 408, 411, 429, and 751 of this
title, and sections 101 and, 178 of Title 12 shall be construed to affect the
legal-tender quality as now provided by law of the silver dollar, or of any
other money coined or issued by the United States. (Mar. 14, 1900, c. 41,
§ 3, 31 Stat. 46.)" Whether or not this section purports to bestow legal
tender qualities upon, national bank notes issued under Section 101 of
Title 12 and Federal Reserve notes issued by the United States is not clear.
9. Legal Tender Cases, infra note 10. This was also the doctrine of the early
English tender cases. In Poug v. DeLindsay, 1 Dyer 82a (1552), it was held
that an obligation to pay sterling might be discharged in legal tender, though
the same was of baser alloy, the court declaring in the headnote, "If, at the
time appointed for payment, a base money be current in lieu of sterling,
tender at the time and place of that base money is good, and the creditor can
recover no other." In the case of the Mixt Monies, Day. Rep. 48 (1601), reported
in 1 HALE, PLEAS TO THE CROWN (1847) 192, the court held that an obligation to
pay £100 sterling current and lawful money of England at Dublin, was dis-
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courts are concerned, by the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Legal Tender Cases,10 holding constitutional the Act " which im-
pressed United States notes with the character of legal tender for
the discharge of debts. 12
In so ruling, the Court recognized that the coinage power in the
Constitution encompassed the right of Congress to make Federal
notes legal tender; '3 repudiated the contention that making the
charged by a payment in new coins declared legal tender in Ireland at their
face value by proclamation of the Queen, although they were not sterling, but
of a baser alloy, nor money current in England. As declared in 1 HALEu op.
cit. supra at 192, " . . . the payment being to be made in Ireland, it was, as
to that purpose, current money of England; . .
10. Knox v. Lee, Parker v. Davis, 79 U. S. 457 (1870) (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Legal Tender Cases); and Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S.
421 (1884).
11. Acts of February 25 and July 11, 1862, and March 3, 1863. 12 STAT.
345, 532, 709.
12. The constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act was vigorously debated in
Congress in 1862 prior to its enactment. The bill was finally passed on Feb-
ruary 25, 1862 and signed by President Lincoln on that day. The notes were
issued and circulated freely, but gold and silver coin immediately rose to a
premium over the notes. In Bronson v. Rodes, supra note 1, the Supreme
Court held that the Legal Tender Act did not apply to contracts specifically
calling for payment in gold coin and that such obligations were not subject to
being discharged in legal tender at par. In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 003
(1869), the Supreme Court by a 5 to 3 majority held the Lcgal Tender Act
unconstitutional as to pre-existing contracts and declared that contracts calling
for payment in currency existing prior to the passage of the Act could not
be discharged in legal tender at par even though they did not stipulate gold.
After this decision the Attorney General made a motion to reconsider the
constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act. The composition of the Supreme
Court meanwhile -was changed and the number of judges was increased to nine.
In the Legal Tender Cases, supra note 10, the Supreme Court, by a 5 to 4
decision, upheld the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts in reference
to debts prior to the Acts as well as following the Acts, thus reversing the
decision in the Griswold case. One of the grounds most heavily relied upon
by the Court was the imperative needs of the Government.
In Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421 (1884), the Court extended the
judicially authorized powers of Congress to legislate in the matter of issuing
legal tender notes by upholding the constitutionality of an Act of May 31, 1878
(20 STAT. 87), authorizing the reissuing of legal tender notes in peace time.
See Anon., The Legal Tender Acts (1867) 2 AM. L. Rv. 403; Chamberlain,
The "Legal Tender" Decision of 1884 (1884) 18 AM. L. REv. 410; Talbot, The
"Legal Tender" Decision of 1884; Rcply to Gov. D. H. Chambcrlain (1884)
18 Ami. L. REv. 618; Smith, The Legal Tender Cases (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 807.
13. Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have
power to "coin money, regulate the value thereof. . . ." It is clear that
there is no express power to issue legal tender notes in the Constitution. The
Supreme Court in the Legal Tender Cases, supra note 10, argued that the
power to issue notes -was a resulting power and was necessary and proper.
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notes legal tender constituted taking property without due pro-
cess; 14 and declared that the prohibition against the impairment
of obligations of contract had no application to the case. 1 But
while it held that legal tender notes were good tender for currency
debts, the Supreme Court limited the decision to contracts which
did not specify payment in gold coin.10 The American doctrine was
thus established that, in the absence of contrary agreement between
the parties, an obligation to pay money is to pay that which the
law shall recognize as money when the payment is to be made."
Fluctuations in the purchasing power, or the foreign exchange
value, or the gold value of the currency will not affect the obliga-
tion, and the creditor of such an obligation assumes the risk of the
depreciation of currency in terms of buying power or gold.'8
While the question of the effect of a revalorization of the dollar
was not raised in the Legal Tender Cases, as was that regarding
the effect of a depreciation of legal tender, it also follows from the
doctrine there formulated that a decrease of the weight and fiue-
ness of the gold content of dollars after the contract is entered
into, and a consequent decrease in their purchasing power, will not
affect the debtor's right to discharge his indebtedness by the pay-
14., Amendment V of the Constitution provides: "No person shall be . . .
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation." The
Court argued that this language was inapplicable in that it forbade taking
private property for public use by direct appropriation but not consequential
injuries resulting from the exercise of a lawful power. A learned decision
of the New York Court of Appeals also dealt at length with this question.
Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyke, 27 N. Y. 400 (1863).
15. Art. I, §, 10, of the Constitution provides that "No State shall . . .
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . ." The Constitu-
tion contains no express prohibition against Congress passing such a law,
and the Court felt that Congress had power to impair the obligation of contracts.
The Court declared: "If, then, the legal tender acts were justly chargeable with
impairing contract obligations, they would not, for that reason, be forbidden,
" Legal Tender Cases, supra note 10, at 550-1.
16. See Legal Tender Cases, supra note 10, at 548.
17. Legal Tender Cases, supra note 10. A number of state courts have
also passed upon the question of constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts.
These cases are not controlling and, for reasons of brevity, are therefore not
cited. A learned decision of the New York Court of Appeals may be singled
out for special attention, this case having been decided before the Legal Tender
Cases. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, supra note 14.
18. In the Legal Tender Cases,. supra note 10, the Court declared, at 548,
that an obligation in terms of currency of a country takes the risk of currency
fluctuations and, whether the creditor or debtor profits by the change, the
law takes no account of it.
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ment of the stipulated face amount of the new dollars, so long as
the new coin or banknote is legal tender for "dollars." 10
It cannot therefore be seriously contended that it is not wholly
within the power of the Federal Government to change the gold
content of the unit of currency or to issue notes which are non-
convertible into gold, or to suspend convertibility of existing notes,
or that creditors, in the absence of special protection by contract
or of special limitation of the effect of such legislation on contracts
entered into before the Act, have any contractual or constitutional
basis for objection to payment in legal tender in satisfaction of their




A solution of the legal problems bearing upon the enforceability
of gold clause contracts depends not only upon the construction
given the provisions of such contracts but also, to a considerable
degree, upon the interpretation of the statutes defining and regu-
lating money transactions generally. The utilization of a creature
of statute-gold currency-as the measure or medium of the debt,
introduces important elements of an ever changing statutory law
as an intrinsic part of the contract. Any amendment of the statutes
governing the issue and use of money may seriously affect the bar-
gain which the parties have made. Thus, changes in the laws
governing currency directed to the legal tender attributes of gold
coin and other forms of currency, their legally defined value, the
convertibility of one form of currency into other media of exchange,
the possession of gold coin or its use by persons generally, its melt-
ing, earmarldng or hoarding, may directly concern the rights of
19. See discussion of Act of 1834, by which the gold content of the dollar
was reduced about 6%, in the Legal Tender Cases, upra note 10, and infra
p. 1076. See Madden and Nadler, op. cit. supra note 4, at 25. There have been
some exceptional instances where the State, following a catastrophic depre-
ciation of its currency, has ceased to use the old unit of currency and has
issued a wholly new and different monetary unit. In such cases revalorization
of pre-existing debts on some basis is usual, and thus creditors are protected
from a complete extinguishment of their claims. The most important case
of this kind was the German Valorization legislation of 1925, growing out
of the inflation of 1923. The Virginia Valorization Acts are also in point.
See Scott v. Hornsby, 1 Call. 35 (Va. 1797). An examination of the operation
of such legislation is beyond the scope of this article.
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parties to a gold coin contract.20 Of the most vital importance to
the rights of parties under such contracts are the following three
'risks which will be examined in some detail: (A) The effect of
depreciation of legal tender; (B) The effect of revalorization of
the gold dollar and the "weight and fineness" clause; and (C) The
effect of impossibility to procure gold coin.
(A) The Effect of Depreciation of Legal Tender
The suspension of convertibility of existing paper currency or
the creation of non-convertible legal tender, if accompanied by a
depreciation in the value of such currency in terms of gold, im-
mediately raises the question of what performance may be required
of a debtor under a gold clause contract. The significance of this
for both debtor and creditor lies in the fact that if a gold coin
clause, or its legal equivalent,21 is enforceable as an obligation to
20. It is to be noted that fluctuations in the purchasing value of gold or
gold-based currency do not necessarily raise legal problems, but may involve
purely economic risks, having only indirect legal repercussions in the inability
of debtors to perform and the consequent insolvency or bankruptcy of the
debtor, or, in the case of public debtors, in the default or repudiation of the
debt. Fluctuations in the general price level of commodities are commonly
regarded as fluctuations in the purchasing power of the currency, and, if such
currency is on the gold standard, then the fluctuations represent changes in
the value of gold. WARREN AND PEARSON, PRICES (1933) 66 ot scq.; LAUGIILIN,
MONEY, CREDIT AND PRICES (1931) 447; CASSELL, THE CRISIS IN THU WORLD'S
MONETARY SYSTEM (1932) 40, 49. These fluctuations may be readily observed
from any index of prices running over a long period of time. Thus, in the
last hundred years, wholesale commodity prices in the United States moved
from 100 in 1821 to 88 in 1834, to 129 in 1837, to 73 in 1843, to 115 in 1857,
to 83 in 1861, to 225 in 1864 (paper currency), to 86 in 1878, to ll in 1882,
to 66 in 1897, to 100 in 1914, to 244 in 1920 (gold), to about 90 (gold) in
January, 1933. WARREN AND PEARSON, Op. cit. supra at 10. In other words
gold in terms of commodity prices, almost doubled in value between 1882 and
1897; dropped over 50% between 1897 and 1914; between 1914 and 1920 dropped
about 68%, thus falling to about 25% of its value in 1897; between 1920 and
1933 r6se about 157% in value. This last rise has meant that debtors today
are obligated to pay principal and interest on outstanding loans in money
having approximately one and one-half times the value in terms of commodi-
ties that it had in 1920. In view of these fluctuations the inescapable con-
clusion is reached that gold or gold-supported money, both in times of peace
. and in times of war, has proved unreliable as a standard of purchasing value.
21. The courts have held that an obligation to pay in gold coin will not
be implied into a contract which does not specifically call for it. Thus an
obligation for the payment of a certain number of dollars, contracted at a
time when the only legal tender money of the country was gold or silver coin
and the dollar was defined as a certain weight and fineness of gold or silver,
will not be construed as equivalent in legal effect to a gold clause obligation
if, prior to the due date, something other than coin is made legal tender. Legal
Tender Cases, supra note 10. Thus in Woodruff v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 291
[Vol. 42YALE LAW JOURNAL1058
pay the nominal amount of the loan in gold coin, the risk of loss
by reason of depreciation of the paper currency will be shifted
from the creditor, who bears it under a currency clause, to the
debtor.
With a view to clarifying the basis of the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in rejecting, in the leading currency cases of the late
sixties and early seventies, the adequacy of a tender of non-con-
vertible depreciated notes in satisfaction of gold coin debts, it is
important to note the general theories regarding the nature of
money -which have from time to time been current in the United
(1896), plaintiffs sought to enforce the lien of certain bonds, which the defend-
ant State of Mississippi contended were illegally issued. The defence was
predicated upon the fact that the act under which these bonds had been issued
by the levee board did not specify that the bonds were to be gold coin bonds.
The bonds provided that the levee board "hereby acknowledge themselves, for
value received, indebted to the bearer in the sum of one thousand dollars in
gold coin of the United States of America, which said sum the said levee
board ... do hereby bind themselves and engage well and truly to pay the
bearer on the first day of January A.D. 1878." The coupons however provided
merely for the payment of "twenty ($20) dollars in currency of the United
States." The Supreme Court held that the bonds were valid obligations of the
State and not being expressly payable in gold coin the obligation was to pay
whatever was money of the United States. Similarly, the Supreme Court
has refused to imply into a "dollar" contract from the surrounding circum-
stances of its inception, an obligation to pay in gold coin. In Maryland v.
Railroad Co., 89 U. S. 105 (1874), the State of MTaryland made a claim for
gold payments on certain stock issued by the railroad company to the State.
The stock had been issued to the State in consideration for its issuing sterling
bonds which were then sold by the company abroad. It was held, that this
imposed no duty on the company to pay the State of Maryland in gold coin
after the Legal Tender Act was passed, though the State was compelled to
discharge its own debt in sterling. A somewhat analogous situation developed
in England in connection with the flotation of French franc Bentes in 1915,
1916, 1917 and 1918. Subscriptions were received at the Bank of England
"with the consent and approval of His Majesty's Government," in pounds
sterling at the then rate of exchange. Alter the franc dropped, the holders,
paid only a small fraction of the interest on their loan, prevailed upon the
British Government to try to obtain from France a settlement of these obli-
gations upon more favorable terms. The French Government insisted, however,
upon the right to discharge the bonds in the then current French francs. Cor-
respondence respecting Position of British Holders of French Rentes issued in
the United Kingdom in 1915-1918, France No. 1 (1931) cmd. 3779. See H. B.
SAMUEL, THE FRENCH DEFAULT (1930).
But in Trebilcock v. Wilson, 79 U. S. 687 (1S71), the term "payable in
specie" in a note was held to be descriptive of the kind of dollars in which
the note was payable, and there being different kinds in circulation at the date
of payment, to-wit: metallic and paper dollars, the term "in specie" was con-
strued as calling for payment in gold or silver dollars of the coinage of the
United States, this meaning having been acquired by the term among traders,
merchants and bankers and in contradistinction to the term "in currency."
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States. The Constitutional Convention conceived of American cur-
rency as being essentially a commodity currency, composed solely
of precious metals having, what was termed, intrinsic value. "2 In
the view of the framers of the Constitution, money was nothing
more than so many pieces of precious metal of certified weight and
fineness. The issuance of legal tender notes in 1862 23 created an
entirely new situation. Certain legal tender qualities were bestowed
by Congress upon something having no "intrinsic" value in the sense
that gold coin possessed such value. With the Federal Government
treating the new currency as in many respects an altogether distinct
currency, and discriminating against it,24 the Supreme Court had
great difficulty in upholding its constitutionality. In more recent
times, the idea of currency necessarily having "intrinsic" value has
been abandoned. Money has come to be generally regarded pri-
marily as a conventional medium of exchange, not necessarily con-
sisting of a precious metal. Gold, whether in coin or bullion form,
has now found its chief use in serving to secure paper currency and
in acting as a restriction upon the volume of paper currency issued.
As a result gold currency during the last few years has ceased to
be issued in almost all countries. In the United States, the recent
Executive Order 25 restricting payments in gold coin by banks, fol-
lowed shortly by Executive Orders 20 requiring the return to the
Federal Reserve Banks of coin and bullion in the hands of indi-
viduals, has resulted in a virtual withdrawal of gold coin from
circulation. Indeed, we are now apparently on the threshold of an
era of managed currency in which gold shall form a part of the
security for currency, the volume of which may be subject how-
ever to legislative manipulation. 27
22. This is fully discussed in Mr. Potter's argument against the consti-
tutionality of the Legal Tender Act in the Legal Tender Cases, supra note 10,
at 465. The country had returned after the horrors of an unredeemed paper
currency to "absolute" money having an "intrinsic" value and neither had nor
-wished any other currency.
23. Notes 11 and 12, supra.
24. Legal tender notes were not receivable for customs duties, note 8 supra,
and a judgment for coin was sustained in Cheang-Kee v. United States, '70
U. S. 320 (1865). The Act of March 17, 1862, 12 STAT. 370, authorized the
purchase of coin with Treasury notes on the most advantageous terms. The
Act of June 17, 1864, 13 STAT. 134, declared that thereafter loans of coin
should not be made unless made payable in coin. The Act of March 10, 1806,
14 STAT. 5, required all returns on income to state whether made in legal
tender currency or coin; and if in coin, then the assessor was to increase the
assessment to the equivalent income in paper.
25. See note 80, infra.
26. See note 82, infra.
27. This question of managed currency is discussed by Pasvolsky, Tho
Gold Standard Before and After the War (1933) 165 ANN. AI. ACAD. 171,
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The leading American authority on the effect of the issuance of
non-convertible legal tender upon the rights of creditors under a
gold coin obligation, is Bronson v. Rodes 23 (1868). The plaintiff,
debtor under a bond secured by a mortgage for fourteen hundred
dollars, payable "in gold and silver coin, lawful money of the United
States with interest also in coin . . . ," tendered United States
notes.29  At the time of the tender, coin dollars were worth con-
siderably more than legal tender note dollars. Upon refusal of the
tender, plaintiff deposited notes to defendant's account and sought
equitable relief from the mortgage lien and a discharge of the debt.
The contention of the defendant was that, in the absence of a
compelling reason of public policy, the Court was obliged to regard
the four varieties of dollars then in circulation as equal in law, and
to give the defendant the right to collect in gold coin. The plaintiff
contended that the United States notes were legal tender; that
Congress in prescribing the composition of coins had not made
them uniform, but nevertheless had declared them to be of the
same legal value; that it was recognized in the statutes2 o limiting
the amount for which copper and minor silver coins would be legal
tender, that they were not intrinsically worth their nominal values
but were made to bear a conventional value by force of legislation;
and that Congress, having the power "to coin money, regulate the
value thereof, and of foreign coin," 31 might debase coin, and the
coin so debased would continue to be legal tender for the payment
of all debts within the United States. At the time the contract was
made there was no legal tender other than gold and silver, and even
173; Hardy, Gold and Credit, id. at 197; Nadler, The Partial Abandonment
of the Gold Standard, 1931-1932, id. at 202. CASSELL, THE CRISIS IN THE
-WoRL's MoNurA.Y SYSTEMI (1932) at 88: "To restore the Gold Standard is
to bind one's currency to gold, a commodity which, under present conditions
and if no particular precautions are taken, must be regarded as singularly
unsuitable for use as a standard of value."
28. 74 U. S. 229 (1868).
29. The first of the Legal Tender Acts, whereby the Secretary of the
Treasury was authorized to issue United States notes, was passed on February
25, 1862 (12 STAT. 345). The Act provided that these notes "shall be receiv-
able in payment of all taxes, internal duties, excises, debts and demands of
all kinds due to the United States, except duties on imports, and of all claims
and demands against the United States of every kind whatsoever, except in-
terest on bonds and notes, which shall be paid in coin, and shall also be lawful
money and legal tender in payment of all debts, public or private, within the
United States, except duties on imports and interest as aforesaid."
30. The amount to which silver, except silver dollars, could be tendered
was limited to five dollars. 17 STAT. 427 (1872), 31 U. S. C. § 316 (1926).
Copper coins were made legal tender for amounts not exceeding thirty cents.
9 STAT. 591 (1851).
31. Constitution, Art. 1, § 8(5).
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without any stipulation calling for payment in gold, a money obli-
gation was legally dischargeable only in coin. State banks had
issued a quantity of notes, the convertibility of which into coin was
uncertain, and these notes were not legal tender.
The Court faced the basic question squarely, eliminating proced-
ural questions. Was the creditor required to accept United States
notes equal in nominal amount to the sum due? Starting with the
premise that it was obliged to enforce the contract in accordance
with the true intent of the parties, the Court noted that when
Congress authorized the issue of legal tender notes, it did not there-
by affect the existing gold coinage. More specifically, the Court
observed that: (1) Coinage of gold and silver coin was not sus-
pended by the Legal Tender Acts; (2) The laws making gold coin
legal tender were not repealed; (3) Customs dues were required
by law to be paid in coin; and (4) There was no express enactment
by Congress that contracts in a particular currency were not sanc-
tioned by law. The Court, moreover, recognized that legal tender
paper currency was not equivalent in value to metal currency. And
it might be added that neither the possession of gold coin nor gen-
eral transactions in coin at a premium over legal tender notes were
prohibited or restrained.
The Court felt that for reasons of plain justice certain consequences
had to follow from this:
(1) The enforcement of the obligation to pay customs dues in coin 02
required that merchants be enabled to buy coin and that the obliga-
tion of their vendees to deliver coin be enforced; similarly, that
banks with which coin had been deposited for safekeeping be obliged
to deliver coin to such depositors.
(2) The Federal Government itself might need coin and contract
for it with banks; if it were held that notes were legal tender for all
coin obligations, then the Government would be defeated in its
object.
(3) The Government might desire to enter into obligations to
deliver coin for bullion deposited with it; judicial sanction could
not be given for the discharge of these obligations in notes.
Following this analysis of the reasons for its decision the Court
declared:
32. In Cheang-Kee v. United States, supra note 24, cited by the Court,
judgment was entered in favor of the United States in coin for import duties.
It had been held, moreover, by the Supreme Court in Lane County v. Oregon,
74 U. S. 71 (1868), that the Legal Tender Acts had no effect on the power of
a state to collect taxes in gold coin.
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"A contract to pay a certain number of dollars in gold or silver coins
is, therefore, in legal import, nothing else than an agreement to deliver
a certain weight of standard gold, to be ascertained by a count of coins,
each of which is certified to contain a definite proportion of that weight.
It is not distinguishable, as we think in principle, from a contract to
deliver an equal weight of bullion of equal fineness. It is distinguishable,
in circumstance, only by the fact that the sufficiency of the amount to be
tendered in payment must be ascertained, in the case of bullion, by assay
and the scales, while in the case of coin it may be ascertained by count." 33
The Court therefore concluded that contracts expressly stipulating
payment in coin were not "debts" which might be satisfied by the
tender of United States notes, within the meaning of the Legal
Tender Act, and gave a judgment in gold coin for the amount of
the obligation.
The Bronson decision has been criticized on the ground that it
confused a money debt with an obligation to deliver specific articles.
It is pointed out that from the remedial point of view, an ob-
ligation can be either a debt or a contract to deliver goods,
but it cannot be both.34 A debt is dischargeable in the amount set
forth and breach of a money obligation does not change the obligation
-it remains a debt, which the law will enforce by ordering payment.
The creditor of a money obligation gets a judgment in the amount
of the debt. But if the obligation in the Bronson case was properly
construed as a commodity obligation, then, it is contended, judgment
should have been given in legal tender for damages, as the breach of
the commodity contract creates a primary right only to collect money
damages to the value of the goods contracted for. Following through
this line of thought it may be argued that specific performance should
33. 74 U. S. 229, 250 (1868). (Italics supplied).
34. HUNT, op. sit. supra note 4, at 111. This work criticizes the Bronson
decision on the following grounds: "In ordering a judgment to be entered for
coined dollars, the Supreme Court of the United States clearly transcended its
power and usurped that of the law-making power." (p. 111).
"The law of the land should be uniformly applied. No good reason can
be advanced why, when a person desires gold or silver coin as bullion, to use
in the arts, or for export, the purpose matters not, the vendee in such a con-
tract is entitled to a judgment payable in that commodity only, while the law
denies the right to have such a judgment to a vendee in a contract for pigs
of lead, or of iron, or for any other commodity.
"Other points are suggested to us, wherein the decision in Bronson v. Rodes
does not harmonize with other branches of the law. It is in conflict with the
legal definition of a debt, and of obligations to deliver specific articles. A
contract providing for the payment of a certain number of dollars in gold
or silver coin, is either a contract creating a debt, or an obligation for the
delivery of that number of coined dollars as a commodity. The contract
cannot be both." (pp. 112-13).
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never be granted to enforce contracts for the delivery of fungible
goods and that therefore the judgment in gold coin was improper.
This apparent inconsistency in the decision arises from the reading
of the case as one holding that a gold coin debt is a commodity
obligation dischargeable in gold coin. A closer analysis of the case
and of subsequent decisions of the Court indicates, however, that the
judgment was not one of specific performance of a commodity
obligation, but a judgment for the payment of a debt in a specific
form of currency. In deciding the Bronson case Chief Justice Chase
was confronted with the difficult problem of determining what form
the judgment should take. The difficulty arose from the supposition
that damages could be assessed only in one description of money.
The Act of 1792 provided "that the money of account of the United
States shall be expressed in dollars . . , dismes . . . , cents
. and milles ....... .and that all accounts in the public
offices and all proceedings in the courts of the United States shall
be kept and had in conformity to these regulations." 35 The Court
for the purpose of the decision assumed the constitutionality of the
Legal Tender Acts and concluded that both gold dollars and legal
tender dollars fell within the scope of the Act of 1792. Said Chief
Justice Chase:
". .. it is a just if not a necessary inference, from the fact that both
descriptions of money were issued by the same government, that contracts
to pay in either were equally sanctioned by law .... Doubt concerning
it can only spring from that confusion of ideas which always attends
the introduction of varying and uncertain measures of value Into cir-
culation as money"; 30
and added:
"When, therefore, two descriptions of money are sanctioned by law,
both expressed in dollars and both made current in payments, it is neces-
sary, in order to avoid ambiguity and prevent a failure of justice, to regard
this regulation as applicable alike to both." 37
These extracts from the decision clearly indicate that the chief
ground for the decision was that the Federal Government itself had
impressed two different kinds of dollars with different legal tender
qualities. In view of the fact that the Federal Government required
that customs duties be payable only in gold coin; that it issued notes,
some of which bore interest payable in coin and others in legal tender
35. 1 STAT. 250 (1792), 31 U. S. C. § 371 (1926).
36. Bronson v. Rodes, supra note 1, at 252.
37. Id. at 254.
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notes; and that notes bearing increased interest were substituted
for notes bearing interest in coin,38 the conclusion of Chief Justice
Chase is sound.
That the principal basis for the Bronson. decision was the dual
monetary system created by Congress, with gold coin having uniaue
characteristics as a currency, rather than the language of the Court
interpreting the debt as a commodity obligation, is further confirmed
by the reference to the Bronson case made by the Court in the Gris-
wold case. Referring to the judgment it had entered to pay gold
coin, it declared:
"This conclusion rested, however, mainly on the terms of the act, which
not only allow, but require payments in coin by or to the government,
and may be fairly considered, independently of considerations belonging
to the law of contracts for the delivery of specified articles as sanctioning
special private contracts for like payments; without which, indeed, the
provisions relating to government payments could hardly have practical
effect." 39
The italicized words clearly indicate that the analogy of the gold coin
clause to a commodity contract should be deemed obiter.
Any argument against giving full weight to the language of the
Court in the Griswold case, based on the fact that this case, denying
the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts, was reversed in the
Legal Tender Cases following a reconstitution of the Court, can be
met by citing the very pertinent language adopted by the newly
reconstituted court in Trebilcock v. Wilson 40 a year later. Seizing
upon an opportunity to re-argue the grounds for the Bronson case,
the Court affirmed its decision and ex%-panded the arguments in
favor of the dual currency theory, ignoring the dangerous analogy
of gold coin contracts to gold bullion or commodity obligations. This
case is of great importance in the interpretation of the Supreme
Court doctrine with respect to gold coin clauses. The Court de-
clared:
"But here the terms, in specie, are merely descriptive of the kind of
dollars in which the note is payable, there being different kinds in circu-
lation, recognized by law.4 '
38. Discussed in Legal Tender Cases, supra note 10, at 578. The practice
and legislation of the Federal government inconsistent with the view that
gold coin was treated on a parity with legal tender notes was discussed in
detail by the Supreme Court in Trebilcock v. Wilson, supra note 21, at 695-697.
39. Hepburn v. Griswold, supra note 12, at 609. (Italics supplied).
40. Note 21, supra.
41. Id. at 695.
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"As the act of 1862 declares that the notes of the United States shall
also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of debts, and this
act has been sustained, by the recent decision of this court, as valid and
constitutional, we have, according to that decision, two kinds of money,
essentially different in theiF nature, but equally lawful. It follows, from
that decision, that contracts payable in either, or for the possession of
either, must be equally lawful, and, if lawful, must be equally capable
of enforcement." 42
And, referring to the Act of 1792,43 the Court added:
"The section has reference to coins prescribed by the act, and when, by
the creation of a paper currency, another kind of money, expressed by
similar designations, was sanctioned by law and made a tender in payment
of debts, it was necessary, as stated in Bronson v. Rodes, to avoid am-
biguity and prevent a failure of justice, to allow judgments to be entered
for the payment of coined dollars, when that kind of money was speci-
fically designated in the contracts upon which suits were brought." 44
It is more than likely that the cause for the analogy drawn by
the Court in the Bronson case between a gold coin contract and a
bullion obligation was the identity in result of construing a gold
coin contract either as a debt or as a bullion obligation that obtained
under the particular circumstances prevailing at the time of the
decision. Assuming that an obligation to deliver coin were construed
as a commodity contract and gave rise, on breach, to a judg-
ment for damages, under the Court's dual monetary system a judg-
ment might have been rendered either in currency or in gold coin.
Since either form of judgment would be equally available, the parties
might stipulate the one in which they desired to recover, and, failing
a stipulation to the contrary, the Court could infer an intention of
the payee of a gold coin obligation to receive his judgment in gold
coin, because such a judgment would avoid the necessity of computing
the value of the gold in terms of currency, equivalent in value to
the commodity stipulated to be delivered, and also avoid the risk
of depreciation in the value of legal tender before the judgment
could be enforced. From the remedial point of view, therefore, the
judgment granted for breach of contract would have been the same
42. Id. at 695-696. In Thompson v. Butler, 95 U. S. 694 (1877), the Court
referred to a debt of $5000 in gold and, after quoting the Bronson case in its
reference to commodity obligations, added, at 697: " . . . but, notwithstanding
this, it is a contract to pay money, and none the less so because it designates
for payment one of two kinds of money which the law has made a legal tender
in discharge of money obligations."
43. Note 35, supra.
44. 79 U. S. 687, 698-699 (1871).
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under the circumstances prevailing at the time of the Bronson case,
whether the obligation was incurred as a gold debt enforceable under
the dual currency theory or as a commodity obligation dischargeable
in either of two currencies under the commodity theory; and for
this reason the legal distinction between a gold coin debt and a
commodity obligation to deliver a quantity of bullion was easily
confused.
A bullion contract was in fact before the Supreme Court in the
case of Butler v. Horwitz 45 (1868), where the obligation due was
on account of rent in the amount of £15, payable in English golden
guineas, weighing five pennyweights and six grains, at thirty-five
shillings each, and other gold and silver at their present (1791)
established weight and rate according to the act of assembly. A
judgment for damages assessed in currency notes to the bullion
value of the gold was reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court
interpreted the understanding of the parties to be "that such con-
tracts should be satisfied whether before or after judgment only
by tender in coin." 4 The Act of 1792 and the provisions of the
contract requiring that satisfaction be made in gold, the Court
declared, "require that damages upon such contracts be assessed in
coin and judgment rendered accordingly." -17  This decision is con-
sistent with the proper measure of damages for the breach of a
contract to deliver a commodity; that is, the market value of the
commodity. Where there is a dual system of currency-gold and
notes-judgment might be rendered in gold. Where there is a single
system of currency-notes-judgment for damages must, of course,
be rendered in such currency.
In Gregory v. Morris 48 (1878), however, the Supreme Court by
dictum swung back to the commodity theory. The Court itself
distinguished the facts from the Bronson case as not involving a
suit "upon the contract for the recovery of the amount agreed to
be paid, but in effect for damages on account of the wrongful de-
tention of property mortgaged to secure the debt." It also appeared
that the party charged with the payment had asked the Court to
compute the damages in legal tender. The Supreme Court, in this
case, relying upon these facts and upon the Browson dictum to the
effect that a contract to deliver gold coin was not distinguishable
from a contract to deliver bullion, felt that it was not compelled to
give judgment in gold coin, and sustained the instructions given the
jury below by the Wyoming Territory trial court to find damages by
45. 74 U. S. 258 (1869).
46. Id. at 261.
47. Ibid-
48. 96 U. S. 619 (1878).
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computing the difference between gold and currency and to render
their verdict in currency.
In United States v. Erie Railway Co.4 1 (1882), the Court held
that, as there was no difference in value between gold and currency,
a general judgment for the amount due was sufficient, but declared
that it would have been proper to render a judgment for coin or its
equivalent in currency, if there were a difference in value. In this
case, however, the sum owing was a tax upon a foreign gold coin
debt, which might well have been viewed as a charge upon a com-
modity obligation.
These two cases, while they give currency to the commodity theory,
do not add anything to the dictum in the Bronson case. The Morris
case relied exclusively upon this dictum, and the Erie case cited only
the Morris case in support of the dictum there expressed. But
despite this rationale of these decisions bearing upon gold coin
contracts, the fact must be recognized that the Supreme Court has
taken an ambiguous position with reference to the, no doubt, ambigu-
ous gold coin obligation. In any event, it is to be noted that if a
legal distinction between a gold coin debt and an obligation to deliver
bullion is proper, the damages recovered for breach 'of a contract
to deliver bullion may be very different from those recovered for
failure to pay gold coin, where illegality or legal impossibility of
paying out gold coin qua money is pleaded by a debtor under a gold
coin contract.50
The holding in the Bronson case was to the effect that, where there
is governmental discrimination in favor of gold coin, a gold coin
contract is enforceable as a debt in terms of that type of money.
There is, however, no doctrine of specific performance applicable
to money contracts except insofar as the same result is reached
within the narrow scope of this dual currency theory developed in
1868. Thus, in an early case decided in 1843, the question arose as
to the judgment to be rendered in respect of a promise to deliver a
sum of money in dimes. There was no difference between the value
of silver and gold coin at the time nor was convertibility of the one
into the other impaired, and the court declared the debt discharge-
able in gold coin, silver dollars or dimes.51 This was sound law in
the United States prior to the Legal Tender Acts and should not
be deemed inconsistent with the Bronson case. It follows therefore
that where gold coin is withdrawn from circulation and only paper
currency remains (subsidiary coins aside), the Bronson case ceases
49. 106 U. S. 327 (1882), rehearing denied, 107 U. S. 1 (1882).
50. See The Effect of Impossibility to Procure Gold Coin, infra p. 1079,
and Gold Bullion Clauses, infra p. 1088.
51. Atchafalaya Rr. & Banking Co. v. Bean, 3 Rob. 414 (La. 1843).
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to be directly applicable and, unless the obligation is construed as
a commodity contract (a construction which the Supreme Court did
not clearly adopt), great difficulty may be ex-perienced in giving the
words "gold coin" any effect.52
The Bronson case may be profitably compared with the recent
(1933) decision of the English Court of Appeal in the case of Feist
v. SocigtM Intercommunale Beige d'Electrieit6.5 This is the first case
to be decided in England, since the pound went off the gold standard,
involving the construction of a gold clause closely patterned on
the gold clauses in American loan agreements.
The facts of the case were as follows. The plaintiff, a holder of
one of the defendant's bonds, sought a declaration of his rights
under the payment provisions of the bond providing that "The
company . . . will . . . pay to the bearer . . . in London,
England, . . . the sum of £100 in sterling or gold coin of the
United Kingdom of or equal to the standard of weight and fineness
existing on the 1st day of September, 1928." A similar provision
for payment of interest followed. On the back of the bond appeared
the statement that the bonds "are declared to be the direct and
unconditional liability and obligation of the company in sterling or
gold coin of the United Kingdom in accordance with the provisions
of the bonds and these conditions." One of the conditions was that
the bond would be construed according to the law of England. Each
coupon stated the amount payable as £2.15.0. At the time the case
was decided, sterling was at a discount of about 30% of par. The
plaintiff sought two declarations in the alternative: first, that the
company was obligated to pay in gold coin and was liable for
damages if it failed to do so; or, second, that it should pay "such
a sum in sterling as may be sufficient to purchase in the market
on the day of payment gold of not less weight and fineness than that
contained in the gold coin of the United Kingdom which would have
52. See the fuller discussion under The Effect of Impossibility to Procure
Gold Coin, infra p. 1079.
53. Transcript of the proceedings before Mr. Justice Farwell, Court of
Chancery, October 27, 1932; transcript of Proceedings before Master of the
Rolls Lord Hanworth, Lord Justice Lawrence and Lord Justice Romer, Court
of Appeal, March 17, 1933. See Comment by Mitchell and Bosmelet (1933)
60 JOURNAL DU DRorr INTERNATioNALn 170. The authors criticize the decision
of Justice Farwell primarily on the ground that it is contrary to the view
adopted by French, Swiss and Italian Courts and the decisions of the Hague
Court of International Justice. It is impossible in the narrow scope of this
article to survey the Continental jurisprudence with respect to the gold clause,
which, being based upon a different principle and involving a different type
of gold clause than here considered, is not directly pertinent to this study.
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been sufficient to discharge such payment if falling due on 1st
September 1928."
In refusing to grant either declaration, Justice Farwell, in the
decision of the Court of Chancery, insisted that the bond was a
contract to pay money in a particular way and was not an obligation
for the delivery of bullion. An obligation to pay £100 could under
the Coinage Act " be satisfied by tendering £100 in whatever was
legal tender at the time; and, in the same way, the obligation ex-
pressed in each coupon to pay £2.15.0 was discharged by paying
this sum in legal tender, and in fact could not have been paid at
any time in gold coin, as provided in the agreement, since no gold
54. The following is a summary of British legislation respecting coinage.
Under Lord Liverpool's Act, 56 GEo. III, c. 68, (1816), gold coin alone was legal
tender, except that silver could be used for that purpose up to 40 shillings.
Under the Act of 3 & 4 WIL. IV, c. 98, § 6 (1833), notes of the Bank of England
were made legal tender for all sums above £5 "so long as the Bank of England
shall continue to pay on demand their said notes in legal coin." By the Coinage
Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vim. c. 10, § 6 (1870), "Every contract . . . security for
money, and every transaction, dealing, matter and thing whatever relating
to money, or involving the payment of, or the liability to pay any money ...
shall be made, executed, entered into, done, and had according to the coins
which are current, and legal tender in pursuance of this Act and not other-
wise." Under the Act of 4 & 5 GEe. V, c. 14 (1914), Treasury notes for £1
and 10 shillings were made current in the United Kingdom "in the same man-
ner and to the same extent, and as fully, as sovereigns and half sovereigns
are current, and shall be legal tender in the United Kingdom for the payment
of any amount." The limitation that Bank of England notes should be legal
tender only so long as the Bank of England continued to pay on demand their
notes in legal coin was withdrawn in 1925, by the Act of 15 & 16 GEO. V,
c. 29, § 1(1), and thenceforth banknotes were legal tender unconditionally.
§ 1(2) provides: That the Bank of England shall be obliged to buy and sell
gold bars at the rate of three pounds, seventeen shillings and tenpence half-
penny per ounce troy of gold of the standard of fineness prescribed for gold
coin by the Coinage Act. Under § 1(1) the right to convert notes into coin
was suspended. In 1928 the Treasury ceased to issue notes. Under the Act
of 18 & 19 GEe. V, c. 13, § 1(2), the notes of the Bank of England in denom-
inations of £1 and 10 shillings were made legal tender for the payment of
any amount. Under § 11 of the same Act, the Bank of England was em-
powered "With a view to the concentration of the gold reserve and the securing
of economy in the use of gold" to call for the return of gold owned by any
person, and to sell it to the Bank "on payment therefor by the Bank in the
case of 'coin, of the nominal value thereof." The Gold Standard Act (Amend-
ment) of September, 1931, 21 & 22 GEO. V, c. 46, § 1(1) (1931), states: "Unless
and until His Majesty by Proclamation otherwise directs, subsection (2) of
section one of the Gold Standard Act, 1925 [providing that the Bank of
England shall be obliged to buy and sell gold bars at the specified rate), shall
cease to have effect, notwithstanding that subsection (1) of the said section
remains in force."
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coin existed 'vith which a 15-shilling payment could be made.0 The
plaintiff's contention that the bond required the payment of such a
sum as represented £100, measured by the value as to weight and
fineness of the golden sovereign on September 1, 1928, however,
would involve the payment of more than £100 legal tender of the
present day. Justice Farwell defined the dilemma before the court
arising out of this clause as follows:
"Either I must give some meaning other than its proper meaning to
the words 'One Hundred Pounds,' or I must give no real meaning to the
last part of the first paragraph of the bond itself."
He saw no way, he said, of making the words consistent.
It was conceded that the attempt to provide for payment in gold
coins only was not illegal, and that the debt could be satisfied by
payment in gold coins. Since under the existing monetary laws
both paper and metal were legal tender, however, the attempt to
enforce payment in a particular form of legal tender was deemed
by the court "an attempt to do something which cannot be enforced
if the contract is a mere contract for the payment of money." Co A
contract for the delivery of gold bullion, which the contract in
question was not, could, however, be enforced by an action for
damages. The court viewed the suggested construction of the obli-
gation of the bond as one calling for some sum which was not in
fact £100, but an unascertained sum which could only be ascertained
at the time the payment was to be made, as an extremely difficult
construction to adopt. In rejecting it, the court admitted that it was
giving no effect to the words "in gold coin."
On appeal to the Court of Appeal,57 the two declarations asked
for in the alternative were somewhat modified. First, the appellant
asked for such a sum in sterling in addition to the nominal 'amount
in sterling mentioned in the bond as would represent any decrease
in the gold value of the nominal amount on the day of payment;
55. See Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U. S. 71, 75 (1868), in which the Court
observed that a legal tender in United States notes of the precise amount of
taxes due could not be made. Referring to the Legal Tender Acts making
United States notes legal tender for "all debts," the Court argued against a
narrow interpretation of the words: "Coin was then, and is now, the only legal
tender for debts less than one dollar ... It is mentioned only to show that
the general words 'all debts' were not intended to be taken in a sense abso-
lutely literal." Similarly, it might be argued that the words "in gold coin"
must not be read literally as applied to the 15 shilling item.
56. A similar argument was made by Justice Bradley in his concurring
opinion in the Legal Tender Cases, supra note 10, at 566, quoted infra p. 1090.
57. Note 53, supra.
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second, for gold coin equal to the standard of weight and fineness
existing on September 1, 1928. The Court of Appeal reviewed the
various statutes bearing upon legal tender 58 and concluded that
any obligation for the payment of money, or, briefly, any debt, was
dischargeable with banknotes at their nominal value.
The Court in its consideration of the case added the fact that gold
coins were not available at the time the debt was due. Gold coins
were not being issued by the mint, and holders of gold coin might,
under the statutes, be called upon to turn in their holdings at their
nominal value. Nor could the obligation be construed as a com-
modity obligation to deliver a quantum of gold of a certain fineness.
The whole agreement indicated it was a debt. The construction of
the agreement as a commodity contract would be inconsistent with
the provisions of the bond in which the obligation is "declared to
be the direct and unconditional liability and obligation of the com-
pany in sterling in gold coin of the United Kingdom in accordance
with the provisions of the bonds and these conditions" and with the
redemption table in the bond. Furthermore, the obligation called
for the payment of £100 in sterling in gold coin. The interpretation
of the contract as a commodity contract would render the words
"in sterling" of no effect. The Bronson case was distinguished on
the ground that the Treasury notes issued by the United States
Treasury in 1862 were discriminated against by the very law that
authorized their issue, customs duties being dischargeable only in
gold coin. The Court also stressed the fact that payment of gold
coin was practicable at the time of the Bronson judgment and that
there was in that contract no such term as "sterling" to create an
ambiguity by alternatives. To summarize this line of thought dis-
tinguishing the Bronson case, there was neither actual impossibility
of payment in gold coin, nor had the Legislature expressed the policy
that all money obligations be discharged in legal tender notes, thus
leaving open the door to the contracting of gold coin debts.
In a separate opinion, Lord Justice Lawrence emphasized the
construction of the contract as a debt, as distinguished from an
obligation to deliver a number of gold coins of a certain weight and
fineness, the legal import of which would be an agreement to deliver
a weight of standard gold. The Justice devoted his opinion to the
contention of the plaintiff creditor that the gold clause did not merely
stipulate the mode of payment, but the quantum of the company's
obligation under the bond. The fact that gold coins were not
generally in circulation at the time the bond was contracted, and
that the coupons were not actually payable in gold by reason of the
58. Note 54, supra.
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odd number of shillings called for, were recognized as factors giving
support to the contention. Only after some hesitation did the learned
Justice confess that he was swayed to the belief that the principal
money secured by the bond was the definite sum of £100 sterling,
"and not an uncertain amount, to be ascertained on the day of payment
by adding to the sum therein specified a further amount of sterling in the
event of a decrease in the gold value of that specified sum."
Having reached the conclusion that the gold clause referred to the
mode of payment, rather than to the question of the obligation, Lord
Justice Lawrence argued that the gold clause
"does not and cannot . . . prevent bank notes, which under the Acts of
1833 and 1928 are made legal tender, from being legal tender. The plain-
tiff, under the express terms of those Acts, is legally bound to accept
bank notes in payment of the moneys secured by the bond, and upon such
payment the indebtedness of the Company under the bond would be dis-
charged and the obligation thereunder extinguished .... A contract that
a debt shall be discharged by payment in gold coins (being one form of
legal tender) cannot abrogate the enactment by the Legislature that the
debt may be discharged by the payment of bank notes (being another
form of legal tender)."
Lord Justice Romer, in his opinion, declared that Section 6 of the
Coinage Act 59 required that a contract to pay a sum of money must
be treated as a contract to pay in coins of the United Kingdom, and
that this "seems to render illegal a contract to exclude the pro-
visions of the Act as to legal tender." For reasons of public policy,
moreover, he contended, the debt should be dischargeable in any
form of legal tender. The great confusion and public inconvenience
of allowing contracts in specific forms of tender was stressed. Thus,
if silver coin contracts were allowed, there would be a risk of
diminishing the silver coinage available for the public at large, and
of imposing upon the mint the necessity of coining more.O The
Justice declared that by reason of such illegality of the gold clause,
the contract must be treated as though the gold clause were excluded.
Aside from the technical distinction between the facts of the
Bronson case and those of the Feist case, in that the English bond
called for £100 in sterling in gold coin-words which introduced
ambiguity by alternatives-, the two factual situations are clearly
distinguishable on the ground that it appeared to be impossible to
59. Ibid.
60. In this connection Lord Justice Romer referred to the instance in 1919
when the price of silver rose to a point where the metal in a half crown (2g.
6d.) was worth 3s. 4Yd.
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procure gold coin in England and that the British Coinage Act 0 '
made all British currency, unlike American currency, of equal power
as legal tender, regardless of whether it was gold or paper. But
the English Court, in rejecting the bullion theory and declaring that
an obligation to pay more than the nominal amount of the debt in
legal tender would not be implied,62 did not in any way depart from
the doctrine of those Supreme Court cases which have hesitated to
render judgments in legal tender with a premium over the nominal
amount and, acting upon the dual currency theory, have insisted
that the gold clause contract be enforced in coin for the nominal
amount.63  If, therefore, the rationale of the bullion analogy in the
61. Note 54, supra.
62. On this point the Feist case is not without parallel in the 'United States.
In Brown v. Welch, 26 Ind. 116 (1866), prior to the decision of the Bronson
case, an obligation payable in gold coin was held discharged by a payment in
notes. The court argued, at 118, that the law made the legal tender equiva-
lent for discharge of debts to the gold dollar and a failure to pay gold "cannot
possibly beget an obligation to pay a greater sum in legal tender notes." Other
state courts also had passed on specie or gold coin contracts in the same sense.
In Schoenberger v. Watts, 10 Am. L. Reg. 553 (Pa. 1862), the District Court
of the City of Philadelphia set aside an attachment requiring the sheriff to
levy "on specie, current gold and silver money," and pronounced itself strongly
opposed to recognizing "a debt of a new and special nature, not capable of
being discharged in the way in which ordinary debts are by law payable,"
Semble, Warnibold v. Schlicting, 16 Iowa 243 (1864); Whetstone v. Colley,
36 Ill. 328 (1865); Galliano v. Pierre, 18 La. Ann. 10 (1866); Wilson v. Morgan,
4 Robt. 58 (N4 Y. 1866); Appel v. Woltmann, 38 Mo. 194 (1866); Reinback
v. Crabtree, 77 Ill. 182 (1875); Schollenberger v. Brinton, 12 Am. L. Reg. 691
(Pa. 1864).
63. Here, too, the English case does not diverge radically from the Supreme
Court cases which, until the decision of Gregory v. Morris, infra, never re-
quired the payment of a premium in legal tender for a gold coin debt. In
Bronson v. Redes, supra note 1, judgment was rendered in coin; in Butler v.
Horwitz, supra note 45, the Court reversed a judgment of the lower court in
legal tender with a premium for the difference in the value between gold and
legal tender. Also see Deming v. Sears, 78 U. S. 379 (1870); Currier v. Davis,
111 Mass. 480 (1873). In Gregory v. Morris, 96 U. S. 619 (1877), the action
was for damages for wrongful replevin of certain cattle, the purchaser of
which had promised to pay a certain sum in gold coin. The Court declared
the original contract was within the doctrine of the Bronson case, but held
that damages for the wrongful replevin need not be awarded in gold coin as
a matter of law even though the measure of the wrong was gold coin. It ap-
peared in the decision that the plaintiff had agreed to take legal tender. Fol-
lowing this case, the Supreme Court in United States v. Erie Railway Co.,
106 U. S. 327 (1882), rehearing denied, 107 U. S. 1 (1882), held that a tax
on interest payments was dischargeable in legal tender (actual equivalent of
the gold percentage) where the payment taxed was a gold payment. It is
not felt that these two cases are inconsistent with the Bronson case or that
they weaken the position adopted by the Supreme Court with respect to gold
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Bronson case presented above is accepted, there is no real conflict
between the two cases with respect to the guiding principles of in-
terpreting a contract calling for a sum of money in gold coin as a
debt dischargeable in its face value in currency.
(B) The Effect of Revalorization of the Gold Dollar and the "weight
and fin eness" Clause
The exercise by Congress or by the President of the power given
under the Thomas Amendment 0 4 to reduce the gold weight of the
dollar, would raise a most interesting question in connection with
coin contracts. Statutes were enacted in some states specifically authorizing
the courts to grant judgments in the medium chosen by the contracting parties.
Thus in California such an Act (Calif. Stat. 1S63, p. 087) was held con-
stitutional by the State Supreme Court. Carpenter v. Atherton, 25 Cal. 564
(1864).
64. The Farm Relief Bill, Part VI, § 34(b)2 provides that the President
be empowered "By proclamation to fix the weight of the gold dollar in grains
nine-tenths fine at an amount that he finds is necessary from his investigation
to protect the foreign commerce of the United States against the adverse effect
of depreciated foreign currencies or in case the government of the United States
enters into an agreement with any government or governments under the terms
of which the ratio between the value of gold and other currency issued by the
United States and by any such government or governments is established, the
President may fix the weight of the gold dollar in accordance with the ratio
so agreed upon and such gold dollar, the weight of which is so fixed, shall be
the standard unit of value, and all forms of money issued or coined by the
United States shall be maintained at a parity with this standard and it shall
be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain such parity, but in
no event shall the weight of the gold dollar be fixed so as to reduce its present
weight by more than 50 per centum."
The debate in the Senate on the Thomas Amendment, 77 CoNa. REC. (No.
37) 2400 et seq. (April 26, 1933), indicated that the primary intent of the
bill authorizing the President to reduce the statutory gold content of the dollar
js to lift commodity prices and thus make the payment of taxes and debts
easier. With regard to the effect of the reduction of statutory gold content
upon the enforcement of gold clause debts, the sponsor of the Bill, Senator
Connally, expressed the greatest doubt. "I, of course, do not know what the
Supreme Court would decide about that . . .All the Senate can do is to per-
form its duty as it sees it, either by reduction of the gold content of the dollar
as it sees fit, or by increase of the gold content of the dollar, and then each
citizen is relegated to the courts to find where that places him with respect to
some particular contract." (2407). He did not contend that the Government
should force its creditors to take the depreciated gold dollar (2409), but de-
clared that " . . . there is quite a different question involved when two cor-
porations are concerned, one owing the other holding the gold bonds ...When
they make a contract stipulating that the bond must be discharged in dollars
of a stipulated standard of weight and fineness, they make that contract with
their eyes wide open, knowing that the Congress of the United States has, not
alone today but has had from the beginning, the power to regulate the value
of that money and change it whenever conditions warrant it." (2409).
the amount of any payment due under a gold clause obligation.
Creditors may contend that the gold clause entitles them to a pro
rata increase in the amount payable equivalent to the decrease in
the gold content of the dollar. On the bullion theory of the gold
clause, this contention should prevail in the absence of any further
restrictive legislation. If the bullion theory is not adopted, however,
a very different result may follow. Moreover, if the gold clause is
virtually read out of the contract by legislation, the change in the
gold content of the dollar would have no effect upon the quantum
of the obligation in terms of dollars.
No legal controversies appear to have reached the higher state
or federal courts involving questions raised by the reduction of the
gold content of the dollar in 1834.5 The Supreme Court did, how-
ever, briefly discuss this revalorization of the gold dollar in the
Legal Tender Cases. Justice Strong declared that an obligation to
pay $1,000, contracted before 1834, could "undoubtedly be discharged
with 100 eagles coined after that date," though they contained less
gold than eagles coined previous to the Act. The general theory
which controlled this situation was expressed by him as follows:
".. . contracts for the payment of money are subject to the authority of
Congress, at least so far as relates to the means of payment. They are
engagements to pay with lawful money of the United States, and Congress
is empowered to regulate that money." GO
The effect of the reduction was that all creditors were subjected
to a proportionate loss in the gold value of their claims.
"The creditor who had a thousand dollars due him on the 31st day of
July, 1834 (the day before the act took effect), was entitled to a thousand
dollars of coined gold of the weight and fineness of the then existing
coinage. The day after, he was entitled only to a sum six per cent. less
in weight and in market value, or to a smaller number of silver dollars.
Yet he would have been a bold man who had asserted that, because of
this, the obligation of the contract was impaired, or that private property
was taken without compensation or without due process of law. No such
assertion, so far as we know, was ever made." 67
Senator Connally contended, moreover, that since the power to determine
what is legal tender is vested in Congress, this excludes the power of private
individuals to say by contract what shall be legal tender (2406, 2407). "I
do not believe that private individuals have any right to undertake to fix a
standard of money by contract, and were I to have my way, I should enact
a law providing that thereafter private individuals should not make contracts
except in the standard, lawful money of the United States." (2411).
65. Act of June 28, 1834, 4 STAT. 699.
66. Supra note 10, at 549.
67. Id. at 552.
[Vol. 421076 YALE LAW JOURNAL
It is to be presumed, however, that in this dictum Justice Strong
was referring to obligations calling for the payment of $1,000 with-
out further qualification. With respect to bonds containing a clause
calling for payment in gold coin of the United States of or equal to
the standard of weight and fineness existing on a certain date, this
dictum is not controlling. To what extent such a clause succeeds in
accomplishing the result of protecting the creditor, in the event of
a revaluation of the dollar at a lower gold content, has never been
clearly decided by an American court. The clause may, however,
be analyzed with a view to determining just what it purports to
provide.
The gold content of the dollar is fixed by statute as 25 8/10 grains
of gold 9/10 fine. s Under the first alternative of the clause quoted
above, "of . . . the standard of weight and fineness e-xisting" on
a certain date, it appears clear that gold coins of a specific type of
minting, in accordance with the date inserted in the agreement,
are required. If at the time of payment this type of minting is the
only one in existence, then the clause is mere surplusage over the
simpler "$1,000 in gold coin" clause. If, on the other hand, such
coins are not the only type existing, but co-exist with coins (also
dollars) of a different weight and fineness, as may have been the
case following the 1834 revalorization, then the creditor might in-
sist, on the strength of the Bronson case, that the debt be paid in
the type of dollars specified in the agreement.-0 But if we assume
that the new coins of lesser gold content were completely to replace
the "old type" coins, a very difficult question would be raised. Would
the creditor be entitled to an amount in gold weight of the new
coins equivalent to the weight of the coins called for by his contract?
No answer to this question can be found in the authorities. If the
BYonon case is read as holding a gold coin contract to be in sub-
stance a commodity contract, it might be successfully contended that
the payee was entitled to damages equal to the value of the bullion
in the gold coins stipulated in his contract. If, however, the decision
in that case is construed as holding that the obligation was a debt
payable in an existing and recognized form of currency, then a
different result might follow.
The words of alternative, "of or equal to," in the "weight and
fineness" clause, appear on close examination to call for the same
thing, namely, gold coin as it existed on the stated date. $1,000 in
gold coin of the United States equcal to the standard of weight and
68. 17 STAT. 426 (1873), 31 U. S. C. § 315 (1926).
69. The reasoning would follow closely the dual currency theory reasoning
discussed supra, p. 1064 et seq.
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fineness existing on a certain date, can scarcely be paraphrased to
read: "That amount of gold coin the weight and fineness of which
will equal the weight and fineness of one thousand dollars nominal
amount of gold coin existing on the stated date." In the actual
clause the definite amount relates to gold coin to be paid; in the
paraphrased clause it relates to the coin which measures the debt,
not to the coin of payment, the amount of the latter being wholly
uncertain. It would require a great straining of the logical faculties
of the Court to accept such a construction. The Court of Appeal, in
the Feist case, in referring to the words "of or equal to," declared
that they were "mere surplusage" and added: "A thing that is of
a ton weight must be of a weight equal to a ton."
In Murray v. Harrison 70 (1867), the New York Supreme Court
had before it a clause reading: ". . . in gold and silver coin of the
standard by which the coins of the United States were regulated by
the laws existing on the 20th day of May, 1846, the sum of $4,000."
The court held, the case having arisen prior to the Bronson case,
that the debt was dischargeable with the face amount of legal tender.
In discussing the clause, the court declared:
"Of course it follows if the legal tender act had not been passed, but
congress, after the date of the bond, had materially debased, or lowered
the standard of gold and silver coin, that the plaintiff would have been
obliged to receive payment of her debt, in such debased gold or silver coin,
by tale or count; that her debt could have been paid in any gold or silver
coin, at its then regulated standard or value, as coin or money, which was
or might be a legal tender for such a sum or amount of money. It is
plain that this result would have followed from the very terms of the
contract, and without reference to the considerations that it was the evi-
dent intention of Bronson, to whom the bond was executed, as executor,
by the contract, to protect the estate under his charge, against the power
of congress to regulate the value of coins, of course to debase them, and
that no court could aid a party in thus undertaking by contract, to thwart
or evade a conceded power of congress." 71
In Brown v. Welch 72 (1866), the contract before the Indiana
court called for a certain sum in gold "or, if paid in paper, the
amount thereof necessary to purchase the gold at the place of pay-
ment." Inasmuch as the case was argued before the Bronson decision,
the court did not award judgment in gold coin. In considering the
effect of the added provision in the contract quoted above, the court
argued that the stipulation to pay paper currency enough to buy
70. 47 Barb. 484 (N. Y. 1867).
71. Id. at 493.
72. 26 Ind. 116 (1866).
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the specified sum in gold "means nothing; for such a sum of paper
as would purchase ingots worth, say, $500 would simply be that
sum in paper. There would be no premium possible."
In Butler v. Horwitz 73 (1868), the debt was measured in foreign
coin of a certain weight "and other gold and silver at their present
[1791] established weight and rate according to Act of Assembly,
on the 1st day of January in each and every year during the con-
tinuance of the present demise." ' 7 This was construed by the
Supreme Court as a bullion contract, for the breach of which damages
must be assessed in gold coin. This case is distinguishable from
the others cited above in that foreign gold coin may well be regarded
as bullion for purposes of any judgment relating thereto.
It thus appears that none of the cases cited upholds the "of or
equal to" clause as entitling the creditor to more than the face
amount of the debt, although under the Bronson case, of course,
judgment might be rendered in gold coin. If the dollar figure is
construed as measuring the debt, and the coin clause is construed
as being purely descriptive, then this descriptive clause cannot at
the same time be construed as controlling the nominal amount of
the debt. It must be conceded, however, that no authoritative
American case has been found squarely upholding this view.
(C) The Effect of Legal Impossibility to Procure Gold Coin
Neither in the Bronsou case nor in any other Supreme Court case
has there been raised any question of the effect upon gold clause
contracts of impossibility to secure gold coin, inasmuch as such coin
has apparently always been available in the United States. It has
already been indicated, on the other hand, that the impossibility in
the Feist case of acquiring gold coin was adduced by the English
Court as one of the grounds for its decision. A similar defense of
impossibility was raised in a notable Canadian decision, American
Chicle Co. v. Somerville Paper Box Co.75 In this case the plaintiffs
held a mortgage which provided that it would be void "on payment
in current gold coin at the option of the mortgagees of $75,000 of
lawful money of Canada. .... " The question was whether the
plaintiffs were entitled to exact payment in gold coin, or payment of
so much Canadian or American currency as would secure gold
coin to the amount of the debt. The Court found that gold was
unprocurable in Canada 76 and concluded that
73. Note 45, supra.
74. Id. at 259.
75. 50 Ont. L. R. 5171 (1921).
76. The Currency Act, STAT. OF CAw., 9 & 10 EDW. VII, c. 14 (1910),
assented to May 4, 1910, provided that American gold coins should pass cur-
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"... it has become legally impossible for a debtor to discharge his
obligation in Canada in gold coin made in Canada or to procure it for the
purpose of exportation to the United States in payment of a debt which
under the circumstances of the case may become payable in that country.
Indeed, my view of the legislation and the orders in council pursuant
thereto is, that they nullify or suspend for the time being the bencfit of
the exercise of the option given to these mortgagees . . .. or rather pre-
vent the debtor from complying with it and enable him to discharge his
debt in money which is legal tender in this country." 77
The effect of this decision is to read an option into the contract
to pay in legal tender if gold coin becomes unprocurable. In this
result the Chicle case does not appear to be in conflict with the Feist
case, assuming that there was real impossibility in the latter. Both
impose the risk of impossibility of procuring gold coin upon the
creditor, in that all he got in each case was legal tender in the face
amount of the debt. The facts of the Chicle case are distinguish-
able, of course, from those in the Bronson case, but the implication
that a gold coin obligation would have been enforced had gold coin
been procurable harmonizes with the holding of the United States
Supreme Court.
Somewhat analogous to the above cases involving legal impossi-
bility is a very old case taken to the Privy Council in 1760.8 The
question presented was the measure of value of a debt contracted
in a currency which had ceased to exist at the time of judgment.
The contract called for "Y2460 in good public bills of the Province
of Massachusetts Bay, or current lawful money of New England,
with interest." The New Hampshire court held tender of bills of
credit current in New Hampshire sufficient to discharge the obliga-
tion. On appeal to the Privy Council Lord Mansfield declared that
he was at a loss to know by what rule to proceed in determining
the quantum of the debt, since the Province bills contracted for
were called in and gone and the contract, by specifically referring
to the bills of credit, clearly required these in contradistinction to
rent and be a legal tender in Canada for their face value, and that every
contract and every transaction relating to money or involving the payment
of money was to be made according to the coins made for circulation in Canada
and which were current and legal tender in pursuance of the Act, unless the
same be made according to the currency of Great Britain or of some British
possession or some foreign state. Ibid. § 15 (3). The Act also provided that
gold and paper currency were legal tender. Redemption of Dominion notes
in specie was suspended on August 10, 1914, prior to the due date of the obli-
gation. The court rejected the contention that the debt must be discharged
in American gold.coin, as the contract called for payment to be made in Canada.
77. Supra note 75, at 522. (Italics supplied).
78. Deering v. Parker, 4 Dall. (App.) xxiii (Pa. 1760).
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the bills of credit of any other colony. The Court, in order to de-
termine the usage in the American colonies in cases of this dnd,
consulted with an expert who declared that after the "old tenor"
"had been called in and sunk" judgments were given in the colonies
in "real money," but that the question of how much to give "was
greatly agitated." The more general method, he said, was to take
the value of the bills when they should have been paid and give
judgment in what was then tender. Lord Mansfield, while approv-
ing the rule as one of right, in general refused to apply it inasmuch
-as
"the currency of the country, had, in the meantime, sunk gradually, and
become in some measure, everyone's loss and that, therefore, in this case,
he thought the loss ought to be divided between them."
Instead of computing the debt at the rate of 27 shillings to the
ounce, the price of silver at the time of payment, the value was fixed
at 37 shillings and the debt was computed at about 100 pounds
-sterling. The case illustrates the very grave difficulty of computing
the value of debts contracted in currency that has ceased to become
available.
In a recent case there was presented the interesting question of
-what would be the effect upon the rights of the parties of illegality
of a gold clause in a municipal bond. The defendant sought an in-
junction restraining a suit on the bonds, contending that the bonds
were null and void because they provided for payment in gold coin
of the United States of the present standard of weight and fineness,
while the decrees validating their issue merely authorized the
district to sell bonds in dollars. The Circuit Court of Appeals
sustained the lower court's denial of the injunction, stating that
"Only that feature of the issued bonds properly could be regarded as
unauthorized. The result of that provision of the issued bonds bcing ml-
enforceable wovld not be to render those bonds unenforceable in so fav:
,as the provisions thereof were legally authorized. An effect of the quoted
provision of the issued bonds being adjudged to be invalid in a suit thereon
would be that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in such suit would be
entered for dollars and parts of dollars, without further specifying what
was payable under the judgment. Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall, 229, 254,
19 L. Ed. 141. Under existing conditions it seems that a judgment in
the form indicated in the suit, the prosecution of which was sought to
be enjoined, would not be substantially different from a judgment calling
for dollars and parts of dollars in gold coin of the weight and fineness
provided for by law at the time the bonds were authorized and issued." 70
79. Greene v. Uniacke, 46 F. (2d) 916, 919 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931), cert den.,
283 U. S. 847 (1931). (Italics added).
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Since the theoretical problems raised by legal impossibility of pro-
curing gold coin are not very different from those raised by illegality
of promising payment in coin, this decision is very suggestive.
The Governmental Regulations enacted since March 6, 1933 have
now directly raised in the United States this question of the effect
of impossibility of paying out gold coin in discharge of gold coin
debts. Banking institutions were prohibited by the Presidential
Proclamation of March 6, 1933 from paying out or permitting the
withdrawal or transfer of gold coin or bullion, or taking any other
action which might facilitate the hoarding thereof.8 0 This Regula-
tion is still in force. By the Act of March 9, 1933,81 the President
80. The President's proclamation of March 6, 1933 (Federal Reserve Bank
Circular No. 1166) declaring a bank holiday provides:
"During such holiday, excepting as hereinafter provided, no such banking
institution or branch shall pay out, export, earmark or permit the withdrawal
or transfer in any manner or by any device whatsoever of any gold or silver
coin or bullion or currency, or take any other action which might facilitate
the hoarding thereof . . . " On March 9, 1933 the provisions of this procla-
mation were extended "until further proclamation by the President" (Federal
Reserve Bank Circular No. 1172).
81. The Act of March 9, 1933 (Federal Reserve Bank Circular No. 1111)
provided in Title I, See. 1, that the proclamations theretofore issued by the
President were approved; Sec. 2 provided:
"(b) During time of war or during any other period of national emer-
gency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency
that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate, or prohibit,
under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses
or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit
between or payments by banking institutions as defined by the President,
and export, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or
bullion or currency, by any person within the United States or any place
subject to the jurisdiction thereof; and the President may require any
person engaged in any transaction referred to in this subdivision to
furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the
production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers in
connection therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before
or after such transaction is completed."
The penalties for violations of this provision are a fine of $10,000, or im-
prisonment for ten years, or both.
Sec. 11 of the Federal Reserve Act was amended by the addition of the
following:
"(N) Whenever, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury,
such action is necessary to protect the currency system of the United
States, the Secretary of the Treasury, in his discretion, may require any
or all individuals, partnerships, associations and corporations to pay and
deliver to the Treasurer of the United States any or all gold coin, gold
bullion and gold certificates owned by such individuals, partnerships, asso-
ciations and corporations. Upon receipt of such gold coin, gold bullion or
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was authorized to regulate or prohibit the export, hoarding, melting
or earmarking of gold coin or bullion, and the Secretary of the
Treasury was authorized to require that all individuals, partnerships,
associations and corporations deliver to the Treasury of the United
States any or all gold coin or bullion owned by such individuals in
payment therefor of "an equivalent amount of any other form of
coin or currency coined or issued under the laws of the United States."
By Executive Order dated April 5, 1933 82 all persons and corpor-
ations were required to deliver gold coin owned by them to the
gold certificates, the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay therefor an
equivalent amount of any other form of coin or currency coined or issued
under the laws of the United States.
"The Secretary of the Treasury shall pay all costs of the transporta-
tion of such gold bullion, gold certificates, coin or currency, including the
cost of insurance, protection and such other incidental costs as may be
reasonably necessary.
"Any individual, partnership, association or corporation failing to com-
ply with any requirement of the Secretary of the Treasury made under
this sub-section shall be subject to a penalty equal to twice the value of
the gold or gold certificates in respect of which such failure occurred
and such penalty may be collected by the Secretary of the Treasury by
suit or otherwise."
82. The Executive Order issued by the President on April 5, 1933 is entitled
"Forbidding the Hoarding of Gold Coin, Gold Bullion and Gold Certificates"
and provides that, under the existing emergency, the President has prohibited
"the hoarding of gold coin, gold bullion and gold certificates within the
continental United States by individuals, partnerships, associations and cor-
porations", and prescribes certain regulations for carrying out the purposes
of the order.
Under Sec. 2 of the order, all persons are required "to deliver on or before
May 1, 1933, to a Federal Reserve Bank . . . all gold coin, gold bullion and
gold certificates now owned by them or coming into their ownership on or
before April 28, 1933", except gold required for (a) "legitimate and customary
use in industry, profession or art"; (b) gold coin and gold certificates in an
amount not exceeding in the aggregate $100 belonging to any one person;
(c) gold coins having a recognized special value to collectors of rare and
unusual coins; (d) gold coin and bullion earmarked or held in trust for a
recognized foreign government or foreign central bank or the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements; (e) gold coin and bullion licensed for other proper
transactions (not involving hoarding).
It is provided in Sec. 3 that any person becoming the owner of any gold
coin, gold bullion or gold certificates after April 28, 1933 shall, within three
days after receipt thereof, deliver the same in the manner prescribed in Sec.
2, unless it fall with the exceptions set forth in said Sec. 2.
Sec. 4 provides that, upon receipt of the gold coin, gold bullion or gold
certificates, the Federal Reserve Bank will pay therefor an "equivalent amount
of any other form of coin or currency coined or used under the laws of the
United States."
Under Sec. 8, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue license3
permitting the Federal Reserve Banks, "in return for an equivalent amount
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Federal Reserve Banks "in return for an equivalent amount of other
coin, currency or credit." An exception was made with respect to
holdings under $100, collectors' coins, gold held for professional or
industrial uses, gold earmarked for a recognized foreign govern-
ment or foreign central bank or the Bank of International Settle-
ments, and gold held under license issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury.8 3  It is further provided in Section 3 of the Order that
of other coin, currency or credit, to deliver, earmark or hold in trust gold
coin and bullion to or for persons showing the need for the same" for any
of the purposes specified in Sec. 2.
Sec. 9 provides for a fine of not more than $10,000 and imprisonment of
not more than ten years for violations of this order.
83. On April 29, 1933, the Secretary of the Treasury issued detailed Regu-
lations Relating to Licensing the Purchase and Export of Gold (Federal
Reserve Bank Circular No. 1220), Art. V of which provides as follows:
"Sec. 1. Licenses for Proper Transactions and for Purposes not Covered in
Preceding Articles. Any person showing the need for gold coin or gold bullion
for a proper transaction not involving hoarding or for gold coin or gold bullion
for a purpose specified in the Executive Order of April 5, 1933, and not
covered by the foregoing Articles of these Regulations, may make application
to the Secretary of the Treasury for a license to purchase, or if such coin
or bullion is already in his possession to retain such coin or bullion, in amounts
as may be reasonably necessary for such proper transaction or purpose. Ap-
plications shall be filed with any Federal Reserve Bank ... "
Sec. 2 provides for investigation of each application by the Federal Reserve
Bank and transmittal to the Secretary of the Treasury with supplemental
information and recommendations.
"Sec. 3. Granting or Denial of the License. Upon receipt of the original
application and the recommendation of the Federal reserve bank transmitting
it, the Secretary of the Treasury will grant or deny the license. A license
will be granted on application for the retention or acquisition of gold coin or
bullion made by any person showing the need for such gold coin or bullion
in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of the Executive Order of April
5, 1933, in cases where such person has gold coin, gold bullion or gold certifi-
cates in his possession, or in obedience to said Executive Order, has delivered
such coin, bullion or certificates. A license so granted shall be for an amount
of gold coin or bullion not exceeding the amount of such coin, bullion or cer-
tificates held or delivered ...
"Sec. 4. Acquisition of Gold. Upon presentation of a license for the acqui-
sition of gold coin or bullion to a Federal reserve bank, such bank shall deliver
to the licensee the amount of gold coin or gold bullion authorized in such
license upon payment therefor in an equivalent amount of any form of coin
or currency coined or issued under the laws of the United States.
"Sec. 5. Reports Required on the Disposition of Gold Coin or Bullion. Any
person holding a license for the retention or acquisition of gold coin or bullion
issued under this Article, who shall at any time dispose of such gold coin or
bullion in accordance with the terms of thelicense or otherwise, shall imme-
diately file a written report in duplicate with the Federal reserve bank through
which the license was issued. ... .
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all recipients of gold coin or bullion are obligated to deliver it to a
Federal Reserve Bank within three days of its receipt, unless they
come within the exceptions noted above. While payment of gold
coin by private individuals or corporations other than banking in-
stitutions is not restrained by this Order, it is practically impossible
for the payor who must meet maturing gold coin bonds to obtain
the necessary gold in the United States, unless licenses are issued
by the Secretary of the Treasury. Moreover, restrictions on deal-
ings in foreign exchange would appear to make the purchase of
gold abroad also practically impossible.8-
Under an unpublished ruling of the Undersecretary of the Treasury, dated
April 29, 1933, the governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was
informed that until further notice the Secretary of the Treasury will grant
no licenses for the acquisition of gold, gold coin, or bullion by persons making
application for the same under the Executive Order of April 5, 1933, for the
purpose of meeting maturing obligations calling for payment in gold coin or
bullion, within the United States or elsewhere, except where such applicants
have surrendered gold coin, gold bullion or gold certificates in obedience to the
Executive Order of April 5, 1933.
84. Transactions in foreign exchange were regulated by the Executive Order
of March 10, 1933 (Federal Reserve Bank Circular No. 1170, March 12, 1933),
which prohibited all transactions in foreign exchange, except such transactions
as may be undertaken (a) for legitimate and normal business requirements,
(b) for reasonable traveling and other personal requirements, and (c) for
the fulfillment of contracts entered into prior to March G, 1933. Dealers in
foreign exchange were required to obtain from each person to whom they cell
foreign exchange, directly or indirectly, a written declaration signed by such
person describing the purpose for which the foreign exchange is purchased
and certifying that the transaction in no way contravenes the Act of March
9, 1933, the Executive Order of March 10, 1933, or any regulation issued
thereunder, and to file with the Federal Reserve Bank written reports which
will show the foreign exchange position of such dealers at any given time.
In a subsequent Executive Order under date of April 20, 1933 (Federal
Reserve Bank Circular No. 1214, April 20, 1933), the President issued the
following regulations:
"1. Until further order, the earmarking for foreign acount and the export
of gold coin, gold bullion or gold certificates from the United States or any
place subject to the jurisdiction thereof are hereby prohibited, except that
the Secretary of the Treasury, in his discretion and subject to such regulations
as he may prescribe, may issue licenses authorizing the export of gold coin
and bullion (a) earmarked or held in trust for a recognized foreign govern-
ment or foreign central bank or the Bank for International Settlements, (b)
imported for reexport, or gold in reasonable amounts for usual trade require-
ments of refiners importing gold bearing materials under agreement to export
gold, (c) actually required for the fulfillment of any contract entered into
prior to the date of this order, by an applicant who in obedience to the Execu-
tive Order of April 5, 1933 has delivered gold coin, gold bullion or gold
certificates, and (d) with the approval of the President, for transactions
which he may deem necessary to promote the public interest.
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So long as these Orders continue in force a court would not be
hard pressed to find that there was legal impossibility of paying out
"2. Until further order the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized, through
any agency that he may designate, to investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under
such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or other-
wise, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit from any bank-
ing institution within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction
thereof to any foreign branch or office of such banking institution or to any
foreign bank or banker, and the export or withdrawal of currency from the
United States or any, place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
by any individual, partnership, association or corporation within the United
States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof; and the Secretary of
the Treasury may require any individual, partnership, association, or cor-
poration engaged in any transaction referred to herein to furnish under oath,
complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books
of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the
custody or control of such individual, partnership, association, or corporation
either before or after such transaction is completed.
"3. The provisions relating to foreign exchange transactions contained in
the Executive Order of March 10, 1933, shall remain in full force and effect
except as amended or supplemented by this order and by regulations issued
hereunder.
"4. Applicants who have gold coin, gold bullion or gold certificates in
their possession, or who in obedience to the Executive Order of April 5, 1933
have delivered gold coin, gold bullion or gold certificates, shall be entitled to
licenses as provided in Section 8 of said Executive Order for amounts not
exceeding the equivalent ot such coin, bullion or certificates held or delivered.
The Secretary may in his discretion issue or decline to issue any other licenses
under said Executive Order, which shall in all other respects remain in full
force and effect."
Under Paragraph 5 of the Order, violations thereof are made punishable by
a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years.
Art. III of the Regulations Relating to Licensing the Purchase and Export
of Gold, issued by the Secretary of the Treasury on April 29, 1933, provides
as follows:
"Sec. 1. License Required. No gold coin, gold bullion or gold certificates
shall be exported from the United States or any place subject to the juris-
diction thereof, or earmarked for foreign account unless a license therefor
shall first have been obtained from the Secretary of the Treasury in accord-
ance with this Article or Article IV of these regulations." It is then provided
that "Licenses may be issued, in the discretion of the Secretary, authorizing
the export of gold coin and gold bullion" in certain instances, those instances
being a recapitulation of the ones set forth in See. 1 of the Executive Order
of April 20, 1933, supra.
"See. 2. Application for Licenses. Application for license under Section 1
to export from the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction
thereof any gold coin or gold bullion shall be made to the Secretary of the
Treasury. .. ."
Sections 3, 4 and 5 deal with procedure in filing applications and in issuing
licenses.
"See. 6. Notification of Issuance of License. At the time the license is issued,
the issuing Federal reserve bank shall transmit a copy thereof to the Collector
1086 [Vol. 42
gold coin.85 Moreover, under these facts the dual currency theory
elaborated in the chain of cases starting with Bronson v. Rodes, in
which the Supreme Court insisted on coin judgments being granted
in gold coin contracts, is no longer applicable. If, therefore, it may
be fairly assumed that judgments in gold coin will not be granted
so long as these Orders remain in force, the courts will have to
grant some other form of relief in passing on contracts containing
the gold clause. The following are four possible alternatives avail-
able to the courts: (1) They may construe fhe debt as dischargeable
in its face amount of legal tender; (2) They may construe im-
possibility of procuring gold coin as suspending the creditor's right
to gold coin until the restrictions are removed; (3) They may give
judgments for damages, payable in legal tender, for breach of the
gold coin contract; (4) They may hold the contract frustrated and
the creditor entitled to restitution. It is obvious that the amount
of the recovery will depend upon which of these theories the courts
adopt. The novelty of the situation and the uncertainty of the
character of further legislation affecting gold clause contracts, render
entirely speculative any conclusion as to which of these courses the
courts will follow.
The gold clause which was generally inserted in bonds floated prior
to the present financial crisis has proved to be unsatisfactory from the
of Customs at the port of export designated thereon. No collector of Customs
shall permit the export of any gold coin or bullion under this Article except
upon surrender of a license to export, a copy of which has been received by
him from the Federal reserve bank issuing such license.
"See. 7. Expiration of License. All licenses to export gold coin or bullion
issued under this Article shall expire fifteen days after date of issue and any
person holding a license who fails to export gold coin or bullion in accordance
with the terms of the license shall forthwith deliver such gold coin or bullion
to a Federal reserve bank."
85. The general law of impossibility as an excuse for non-performance can-
not be gone into in this article. Reference is made to the following authorities:
Woodward,.Impossibility of Perfor;avce as an Excusc for Brcach of Contract
(1901) 1 CoLe. L. REv. 529; Page, The Development of tMe Doctrine of Impos-
sibility of Performance (1920) 18 MICH. L. REv. 589; Corbin, Supcrvening
Impossibility of Performing Conditions Prcecdent (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 421,
422; 3 W=STON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1938; 2 RESTATE5MENT OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (Am. L. Inst. 1932) §§ 457-8. And see Larabee Co. v. Crossman,
100 App. Div. 499, 92 N. Y. Supp. 565 (1st Dep't. 1905), aff', 184 N. Y. 586,
77 N. E. 1189 (1906). Perhaps the closest analogy to the facts here discussed
is to be found in Prohibitions and Mandatory Legislation Enacted During the
War. See Blair, Breach of Contract Due to War, SELzcTED REiNGs ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 1015. The availability in an action for damages
arising from breach of contract, of the defense of impossibility by reason of
governmental regulations is discussed in Mawhinney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills,
Inc., 231 N. Y. 290, 132 N. E. 93 (1921).
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economic standpoint in that it has failed to stabilize the value of the
debt, a failure resulting from the wide fluctuations in the value of
gold during recent years.8 6 The clause now threatens to prove un-
satisfactory from a legal standpoint as a means of insuring the
creditor a recovery in gold coin or its market equivalent in currency.
Moreover, if the American courts follow the Feist case, it is doubtful
whether the gold clause can be rewritten so as to afford the protection
desired . 7 In view of this uncertainty, it may not be inappropriate to
discuss briefly some of the alternatives available to prospective
borrowers and lenders who desire to secure adequate protection
against fluctuations in the value of paper currency. The following
forms of clauses are therefore discussed primarily with a view to




Three types of gold bullion clauses as measures of debts may be
distinguished: (1) An obligation to deliver bullion and nothing
else; (2) An obligation to pay the equivalent of a certain weight of
bullion in (a) coin or (b) legal tender; (3) An option in the promisee
to demand a certain amount of bullion or currency in the form of
coin or legal tender. Only the first type of bullion clause is a true
commodity obligation, entitling the holder, upon failure to receive
the commodity stipulated, to damages measured by the value of the
commodity at the time and place of delivery.8  The first alternative
of the second of these types has been viewed as equivalent in effect
to a gold coin clause. In Sears v. Dewing 89 (1870), the Supreme
Court held an obligation calling for the payment of "four ounces two
pennyweight and twelve grains of pure gold in coin money" to be
86. Note 20, supra.
87. Note 20, supra. A modification of the gold clause appeared in the ad-
vertisement by The Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston of a now issue
of notes. N. Y. Times, April 18, 1933, p. 23. This provides: "Principal and
interest payable in gold coin of the United States of America, if payment in
such gold coin is lawful at the time such payment becomes due."
88. In Clark v. Minor, 73 Ga. 590 (1884), it was held that cotton notes
entitle the holder on breach to the value of undelivered cotton at the time and
place of delivery. And see Gilbreath v. Dilday, 152 Ill. 207, 38 N. E. 572
(1894); Wilson v. Morgan, 4 Robt. 58 (N. Y. 1866) (distinguishing a bullion
from a coin contract).
89. 78 U. S. 379 (1870), rev'g 96 Mass. 413 (1867). In this case the Court
construed the lease as requiring the payment of $20 in gold coin a quarter
prior to 1884, when the gold content of the dollar was diminished, and $21.31
in gold coin a quarter thereafter. See also Butler v. Horwitz, supra note 45.
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a contract for "a specified weight of pure gold solvable in coin money,"
and reversed a judgment in favor of the creditor for the legal
tender value of the gold at the time of the breach. Under this
decision a clause specifying weight and fineness of gold payable in
coin is in no essential respect different from a payment clause calling
for payment in gold coin, except that account may be taken in the
judgment of the -weight and fineness of the coin in which judgment
is given. The second alternative of the second type of bullion clause,
calling for the payment of legal tender, makes the obligation simply
one for a sum of money to be determined by valuing the stated
amount of gold at the time and place of payment. The use of this
type of contract as the measure of a debt directly raises the question
of the negotiability of the obligation. The third type of gold bullion
clause, providing for an option in the payee, raises a very real
practical difficulty. If the option is in the payee to demand either
one of two kinds of performance, failure by the payee to exercise
the option on the due date might enable the debtor to discharge fhe
obligation by performance of either of the two alternatives." If
the intention of drafting an obligation of this kind is to give to the
payee the benefits of a bullion obligation, with all of the advantages
of an obligation to pay an amount certain in money, the mechanical
difficulty of preventing the option from shifting to the debtor may
make such an obligation impractical, even though it be deemed
negotiable by reason of such a stipulation.91
The dictum in the Bronson case analogizing the gold clause obliga-
tion to a bullion contract failed to note the distinction, which would
become of importance in the event that legislation is enacted making
90. HUNT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 151; Johnson v. Seymour, 19 Ind. 24
(1862). If the time within which the payee may elect which of the two alterna-
tive types of performance he demands is limited, the option shifts to the obligor
upon the expiration of this time. Townsend v. Wells, 3 Day R. 327 (Conn.
1809). But in the absence of special agreement the option is presumed to
be in the payor. CHiPMrAN, LAW OF CONTRACTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF SPECIFCK
ARTILEs (1822) 35; Nipp v. Diskey, 81 Ind. 214 (1881). In Alarlor v. Texas
& P. R. Co., 21 Fed. 383, 385 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884), where the option was in
the payor, the court declared: "It is elementary that when a promise is in the
alternative, to pay in money or in some other medium of payment, the promisor
has an election either to pay in money or in the equivalent, and after the day
of payment has elapsed without payment the right of election on the part of the
promisor is gone, and the promisee is entitled to payment in money." An offer
to accept payment at the rate of 5',c. gold or 9c. currency becomes an option
of the payee after due date. Stephens v. Howe, 34 N. Y. Super. Ct. 133 (1873).
91. § 5(4) of the N. I. L. provides: "The negotiable character of an instru-
ment is not affected by a provision which gives the holder an election to require
something to be done in lieu of payment of money." And see Hosstatter v.
Wilson, 36 Barb. 307 (N. Y. 1862).
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gold coin debts dischargeable in legal tender,92 between a contract
for the delivery of goods, notably gold, and a contract solvable in
money by means of a count of certain coins. Justice Bradley,
however, in his concurring opinion in the Legal Tender Gases,0 3
in the course of which he expressed himself as favoring a construction
of the Legal Tender Acts as authorizing the discharge of gold coin
obligations in legal tender, made a sharp distinction between a
gold coin contract and a bullion contract:
"If the contract is for the delivery of a chattel or a specific commodity
or substance, the law does not apply. If it is bona fide for so many
carats of diamonds or so many ounces of gold as bullion, the specific con-
tract must be performed, but if terms which naturally import such a
contract are used by way of evasion and money only is intended, the law
reaches the case." 04
Similarly, in Trebilcoc v. Wilson,"5 in his dissenting opinion,
Justice Bradley declared:
"Only in those cases in which gold and silver are stipulated for as
bullion, can they be demanded in specie like any other chattel. Contracts
for specie made since the legal tender acts -went into operation, when
gold became a commodity subject to market prices, may be regarded as
contracts for bullion. But all contracts for money made before the acts
were passed must, in my judgment, be regarded as on the same platform.
No difflcult can arise in this view of the case in sustaining all proper
transactions for the purchase and sale of gold coin." 96
The definite advantage of the bullion obligation over a gold coin
obligation arises at a time when gold coin becomes unavailable, or
where by legislation or court decision contracts for gold coin are
declared to be dischargeable in their face amount of legal tender.
92. Such a bill has been proposed by Representative Campbell. H. R. 14604,
Feb. 8, 1933. A discussion of the constitutionality of such a law is beyond the
scope of this article. The difficulty of determining its constitutionality lies not
so much in the restraints imposed by the Constitution, which would not appear
to be applicable, as in finding the power in Congress to enact such a law. Such
a statute might be deemed incidental to the power to coin money and regulate
the value thereof (see note 13, supra), as this power was broadly construed
by the Supreme Court in the Legal Tender Cases, supra note 10, and particu-
larly in the opinion of Justice Bradley in that case. It has already been held
that the states have no power to pass such legislation. Garis, supra note 4;
Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537, 52 Pac. 333 (1898).
93. Note 10, supra.
94. Id. at 566.
P95. Note 21, supra.
96. Id. at 699. (Italics supplied).
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Even the Feist case did not purport to rule that contracts to deliver
gold bullion would be affected by the suspension of the gold standard.
However, the use of the bullion clause under existing regulations
restraining dealings in bullion is open to grave doubt. Moreover,
from the standpoint of use in bonds, the clause involves the fatal
disadvantage of non-negotiability and uncertainty of the amount to
be repaid. 7  While in a few instances this may not be a controlling
consideration, in most cases it renders the clause quite unworkable.
IV
Commodity Clauses and Stabilized Units of Value
While there is at.the present time a very strong movement among
economists and legislators to define and to put into force the nec-
essary measures to stabilize the purchasing value of currencies either
independent of gold or tied to gold,98 this stability remains still to
be achieved. Pending such stabilization any provisional measures
available to private parties contracting with reference to future
payments can be considered as directed toward the protection of
their obligations against fluctuations in the value of the currency
measuring their debts.
As a matter of historical interest, debt obligations have been
made solvable in a great variety of ways. Rents and taxes in
economically backward countries were quite commonly payable in
97. Under § 1 (2) of the N. I. L., an instrument to be negotiable must conform
with the requirement that it "contain an unconditional promise or order to pay
a sum certain in money." Under this provision, if the paper is so drawn as to be
payable in commodities or labor, or in any other medium than money, it is not
negotiable. A commodity note is clearly non-negotiable: Brooks v. Greil Bros.,
192 Ala. 235, 68 So. 874 (1915); President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v.
Morgan, 242 N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594 (1926), holding an interim certificate non-
negotiable. In New York, under the Hofstadter Act, N. Y. PEnsoNAL PorPmrry
LAw (1926) art. VIII, §§ 260-2, security receipts, equipment trust certificates
and corporate bonds which by their terms entitle the bearer to the benefits thereof
are given certain aspects of negotiability. The Hofstadter Act does not by
its terms exclude from its benefits any bond for the payment of an uncertain
amount or calling for delivery of gold bullion. It is not clear whether the strict
requirements of the N. I. L. with respect to the payment clause have any
bearing with reference to bonds in New York.
98. A number of measures designed to have this effect are now being dis-
cussed in Congress. One of the most recent proposals is the Connally Bill (73d
Cong., 1st Sess., S. B. 1111, introduced March 13, 1933), which provides for the
creation of a new currency of flexible gold value, the mint rate of the currency
varying daily in accordance with wholesale price fluctuations. See FisEine,
STABILIZING THE DOLLAR (1920).
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kind in the produce of the debtor. 99 A variation on this practice of
using commodities as a measure of value was employed in certain
leases which provided for the payment of a certain quantity of a
given commodity which was not produced by the lessee, but which
was used solely as a measure of value. In such cases payment might
actually have been made in money equal in amount to the cost of the
stipulated quantity of the commodity specified in the contract.109
In Germany, following the war, loans were floated in terms of grain
and other commodities and a law passed in June, 1923, sanctioned
the issue of such obligations. 101 One of the first obligations of this
character was the Mecklenburg Schwerinsche Roggenivert Anleihe,
a rye loan.102 The payments under this loan were to be made in
money equivalent in amount to the sum necessary to purchase a
definite quantity of rye on the Berlin Produce Exchange.
The price of a given commodity may fluctuate more than gold, and
if the commodity is bulky or perishable its value may vary greatly
from one place to another, thus adding to the instability of the value
of the obligation. A more stable unit of value may be devised by
using as the measure of the obligation a number of commodities or
an index number calculated by averaging the relative values in
terms of currency of a number of commodities. Contracts calling
for payments in money, the amount of which is to be calculated upon
the currency value of several commodities, have not been unknown
in the past. The tabular standard in use in the Massachusetts Bay
Colony in 1780 was enacted by law for rating bills of public credit.
Notes were issued specifying: "Both Principal and Interest to be
paid in the then current Money of said State, in a greater or less
Sum, according as Five Bushels of Corn, Sixty-Eight Pounds and
four sevenths Parts of a Pound of Beef, Ten Pounds of Sheep Wool,
and Sixteen Pounds of Sole Leather shall then cost, more or less
than One Hundred and Thirty Pounds current Money, at the then
current prices of the said articles." 103 There is even a record of
99. English Tithes were, for example, measured in agricultural produce.
FISHER, THE MONEY ILLUSION (1928) 116 et seq.
100. FISHER, loc. cit. supra note 99, describes such a lease where the rent
was payable in "First quality of Old Russian Sables Iron."
101. Law of June 23, 1923. REICHSGESErZBLATT (1923) 407.
102. Madden and Nadler, aupra note 4, at 23, in describing this loan,
remark: "Obligations stated in commodities have not proved very satisfactory,
and as a result a large part of them have either been repaid or have been
converted into gold obligations. The reason for the weakness of this class of
obligation is due to the fact that an individual commodity is subject to greater
fluctuation than the price of gold."
103. Fischer, The Tabular Standard in Massachusetts Histoij (1913) 27
QUART. J. OF EcoN. 417, 437. These notes, known as "depreciation notes," wore
issued to pay soldiers and were in use for several years.
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a valuation of such a note having been made by a court.10I In
Australia, mortgages have recently been drafted providing for an
adjustable currency debt, the exact amount due being determined
by using the weighted average index for "food, groceries and rent
for all houses for the six capital cities" published in the Quarterly
Summary of Australian Statistics. 0 5
In one case at least a public loan was issued in the United States
wherein both principal and interest were to be paid in "stabilized"
dollars. This was the Rand Kardex Company Seven Per Cent.
Thirty Year Stabilized Debenture Bonds obligation.100 The obligation
of the Company was to repay upon a certain date "such sum of
money as shall possess the present purchasing power of One Thous-
and Dollars ($1,000) with interest thereon at the rate of seven
per cent. per annum, payable quarterly on January first, April first,
July first and October first, in such sums as shall, at the respective
times of payment, equal in purchasing power one and seventy-five
one hundredths per cent. (1.757) of said purchasing power of One
Thousand Dollars ($1,000), all to be based upon an index number
of the prices of commodities defined and fixed in accordance with
the amplified statement below." 107 The index employed was the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics index number of whole-
sale prices. A system is worked out whereby the actual amount
payable in dollars is adjusted to the movement of the wholesale
index. The stabilization employed in this loan was designed to
operate both in raising and lowering the amount to be paid to the
bondholder.
The defects of a form of payment clause such as this are two-
fold: first, the very doubtful negotiability of the bonds in view of the
uncertainty of the amount to be paid;1 8 and second, the mechanical
difficulties that may arise in connection with the workings of the index
employed for measuring the amount to be paid in money. Corporate
bookkeeping under an index clause system for long term loans would
be extremely difficult. The weighting of the index and the component
elements of the index are subject to change and this change might
104. Four justices of the "Supreme Judicial Court" filed a certificate of the
prices found for the four staples and concluded that each pound of face value
was worth 9 1/5 d. of silver. Massachusetts Archives, 142, p. 310, cited in
FiscHER, supra note 103, at 445.
105. Watts, Inflation Clauses in Mortgages and Lcascs (1931) 4 AusT.
L. J. 315.
106. The agreement is dated July 1, 1925. The loan was called by the
company a few years after it was issued.
107. Agreement between Rand Kardex Company, Inc. and Buffalo Trust
Co., 1, p. 5.
108. Note 97, supra.
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result in a radical departure from the bases of measuring the index
of wholesale prices.10 Moreover, if the particular index stipulated
in the bond should be abandoned altogether, an event over which
neither the company, the trustee nor the bondholders could have
any control, a difficulty would immediately arise as to how the debt
should be measured. It is provided in the Rand Kardex loan agree-
ment that should the Bureau of Labor Statistics discontinue the
computation of the index, "there should be substituted therefor by
the Trustee, as specified more fully in said indenture, such other
index number or method of ascertaining changes in the price level
as resembles in the opinion of the Trustee most closely the indexr
number and method of arriving thereat of such Bureau." This
arrangement is not entirely satisfactory as it imposes somewhat
too great a responsibility upon the trustee.
Furthermore, since the chief sanction for the index clause is that
its use enables the parties to eliminate fluctuations in the value of
money qua money and to deal in real purchase values, the component
elements of the index must be constantly adjusted to represent at
all times the actual values of surrounding life. How periodic ad-
justments in the index could be effected without endangering the
rights of a holder of an "index" obligation is problematical. For
the purpose of international loans, some authority other than a
national governmental bureau's index -figures might be necessary. It
has recently been suggested by Sir Arthur Salter 110 that the League
of Nations or the Bank for International Settlements publish peri-
odically an authoritative index, or several indices of world prices,
so that those desiring to do so could use these indices for long-term
contracts. While Sir Arthur Salter's idea meets the objection di-
rected against any one national index because of its control by one
government, his proposed index would necessarily have many draw-
backs. Before an international index could become acceptable to
prospective borrowers and lenders all over the world, there would
have to be some assurance that it would be permanent and that
improper alteration of the basis of the index figures would not be
made by interested nations or private interests representing com-
modities.""' It is equally evident that it is impossible for anyone to
109. There is also the question of whether the wholesale commodity index
as the standard of value is an appropriate measure of the debt inasmuch as
most bondholders would be more interested in retail prices which do not fluctuate
in direct proportion to the wholesale index and have a tendency to lag behind
the wholesale index.
110. Sir Arthur Salter, A Year and a Half of Crisis (1933) 22 YALr Rv.
217, 230.
111. The determination of an iiiternational index which could become im-
mensely important to debtors and creditors alike could scarcely be confided to
any body subject to interference by political interests of different countries.
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fix at this time a national or an international index for all time,
or even for a decade, which after the lapse of several years will be
properly weighted. It would seem that elaborate machinery for
maintaining a reliable international index would only be called into
operation by the complete breakdown of the gold standard in all
countries and the universal loss among business people of hope in
the restoration of the currencies of the world to a workable gold
standard. But these objections having been raised, there is much
to be said in favor of Sir Arthur Salter's idea of an international
index. It would give a uniform basis for values, regardless of the
gold reserves in the various countries or the stability of their cur-
rencies, and yet in so doing it would, without disturbing debt values,
allow for variations in currency exchange values resulting from
local conditions.
The chief deterrent to the floatation of loans containing an "index"
clause is the practical consideration of the unfamiliarity of the
investing public with the workings of such indices and its apparent
apathy to the need for any improvement upon the gold coin clause
as a measure of value. So long as the investing public is content to
invest in bonds payable in currency or in gold coin, so long as
borrowers are willing to obligate themselves to pay in gold coin in
the future, regardless of its value, no immediate need is likely to
arise for an "index" clause. But if a demand for an index clause
should ever materialize, a clause could no doubt be drafted to meet
many of the objections noted, and questions of negotiability, listing
of index clause securities on stock exchanges and valuations of the
debt for various purposes, while presenting formidable and novel
problems, could be solved by new legislation if not solvable by the
adoption of new practices in financial circles.
The inevitable conclusion concerning the utilization of any index
clause is that only the gravest emergency would make desirable or
possible its adoption as a measure of debts and that if the com-
modity index is indeed a sound measure of value it would be well to
adopt it as the basis of currency 112 rather than of individual debts.
Perhaps this emergency is now at hand. But so long as there is a
definite prospect that the world's currencies will be restored to the
gold standard, the adoption of such indices in loan contracts would
appear to be undesirable and impractical.
112. Note 98, supra.
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